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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION, METHODOLOGY AND STRUCTURE 
 
1.1. Title and central question 
 
This study is titled Changes in Work and Production Organisation in the Automotive 
Industry Value Chain: An Evaluation of the Responses by Labour in South Africa. Central 
to this study is the objective of addressing the question: What are the changes in work 
and production organisation in the South African automotive industry value chain, their 
impact on members of the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA) 
and the union’s responses? 
 
1.2. Introduction  
 
The South African automotive industry value chain and its operating environment have 
undergone significant change. This applies particularly to the intensified change that has 
occurred since 1995 – a year after South Africa entered a democratic dispensation.  
 
During apartheid rule, the country was largely, although not completely, isolated from the 
international economic operating environment. This was partly through sanctions. 
Isolation led to some of the automotive industry Multinational Corporations (MNCs), 
mainly assembly plant companies – Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) – pulling 
their investments out of South Africa. As a result, among other generally the South 
African automotive industry has lagged behind in the introduction of new models. 
Factors that contributed to this include licensed production.  
 
Justin Barnes (2000) points out that prior to the 1990s the majority of domestic-based 
OEMs were operating under licensing agreements under associated MNCs. Implicit in 
this is that frequent changes in work and production organisation, which are today 
associated with the rapid introduction of new models, were not much on the agenda at 
that time. The South African automotive industry was also extensively protected by a 
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series of Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) programmes pursued prior to the 
1990s to promote local content (Black 2009).   
 
South Africa’s 1994 transition to a democratic dispensation changed the context 
completely from its pre-1990s conditions. The country was to undergo a rapid 
reintegration into the international economic operating environment. This time, however, 
it was not under colonisation, but globalisation, as discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
As a leading manufacturing sector in the South African economy, the automotive 
industry merits close study; the strategic nature of this industry is further examined in 
Chapter 3.  
 
Linked to the strategic nature of the automotive industry, in 1995 the democratic 
government adopted a new industrial policy for the industry: the Motor Industry 
Development Programme (MIDP). The MIDP was to mediate the reintegration of the 
country’s automotive industry into the global economic operating environment. The 
MIDP gradually phased down tariffs but provided export incentives and support, 
including duty rebates and import–export complementation mechanisms (Barnes 2000; 
Black 2001). 
 
Under the MIDP, tariffs were scheduled to phase down to 40 per cent for light vehicles 
and 30 per cent for components by 2002 (Black 2009). Later policy reviews scheduled 
further phased-down tariff reductions to 2012 (Black 2009). Compliance with the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) led government to review the MIDP and replace it with the 
Automotive Production and Development Programme (APDP). This involved a shift 
from export support to production support, while phased-down tariff reduction (albeit at a 
slower pace) are transitionally maintained as the MIDP gives way to APDP. The MIDP is 
further discussed in Chapter 3 in terms of the location and position of South Africa with 
regard to the automotive industry. 
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Under globalisation and as part of the reintegration of the domestic automotive industry 
into the global operating environment, the mid-1990s also marked the beginning of a 
process of rapid change in ownership structures within the industry. Barnes (2000) points 
out that prior to the 1990s the majority of domestic-based OEMs were either South 
African owned or owned under joint ventures with associated MNCs. He underlines the 
fact that since the mid-1990s there has been a change, in that all seven of the OEMs with 
production facilities in South Africa are now fully owned by the respective MNC parent 
companies. The seven MNC OEMs are as follows: headquartered in Germany, Bavarian 
Motor Works (BMW), Mercedes Benz (Daimler-Benz) and Volkswagen (VW); 
headquartered in the USA, Ford Motor Company (FMC) and General Motors (GM); and 
headquartered in Japan, Toyota Motor Corporation and Nissan Motor Company. 
 
Changes in ownership were to be followed by radical changes in work and production 
organisation. These were largely driven by functional integration as implemented by the 
respective MNCs under globalisation of production. Functional integration in the 
automotive industry has largely been implemented through global production and 
management strategies. Part of this, as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, are production 
systems that MNCs standardise across their production facilities worldwide, regardless of 
where they are actually located. The automotive MNCs’ restructuring process does not 
begin and end with assembly plants; as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, MNC OEMs also 
develop and restructure the supply production chain. 
 
Unlike the automotive industry, other manufacturing industries in South Africa – for 
example, white goods (stoves, fridges, microwaves, washing machines etc.) and clothing 
and textiles – did not enjoy an industrial policy treatment like the automotive industry 
under MIDP and now APDP. They suffered seriously under the regime of rapid 
liberalisation, which became the dominant feature of market integration in the dominant 
form of globalisation (as discussed in Chapter 3). The new South African democratic 
government – controversially – also embraced liberalisation under a macroeconomic 
policy titled Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR).  
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Although facilitated under the MIDP, the impact of liberalisation in the South African 
automotive industry has received much attention (e.g. Black 2009; Barnes 2002, 2007; 
Barnes & Morris 2007; and Masondo 2003). With the exception of Barchiesi (1997), 
Forrest (2005), Masondo (2003), Sitas (1983) and Webster (1985) much of the literature 
development in the automotive industry has tended to focus on industry competitiveness, 
with little attention paid to labour, particularly unions. 
 
David Masondo (2003) looks at trade liberalisation and work restructuring in post-
apartheid South Africa, using BMW as a case study. He reveals the nature of the 
workplace regime that emerged at BMW in the post-apartheid period and in the context 
of the drive for competitiveness. He finds the existence of a number of institutional 
forums that BMW has put in place to provide for worker participation in work 
organisation. These include: the Scheduling Committee; Suggestion Schemes; Quality 
Circles; a Joint Committee, inclusive of management and NUMSA shop stewards; and 
even the use of production teams (which are common under lean production in-plant 
work organisation). The objectives of these structures include soliciting worker views, 
skills and abilities to the benefit of the company. 
 
Masondo (2003) finds that restructuring of the workplace regime at BMW has led, among 
other things, to what he calls ideological flexibility. This includes strategies for 
identifying workers as ‘associates’, which can have the effect of making them feel at one 
with the company. However, he also finds that to some degree there is, among workers, a 
lack of confidence about the institutional mechanisms that the company has put in place. 
Ensuring that workers identify themselves with the company’s objectives appears to be 
overwhelming their meaningful involvement in work organisation. Masondo (2003) 
further finds that there are generational tensions in the workforce. With regard to the 
white goods industry, Webster et al. (2008) find the same. 
 
At BMW, the generational tensions correlate with the introduction of new technology and 
subsequent changes in work. In turn, this is associated with increased demand for higher 
level skills, which are said to be possessed mainly by younger workers.  
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In line with Franco Barchiesi (1997, 1998), Masondo (2003) too finds that there is 
increased flexibility in the automotive industry. Barchiesi (1998) concludes that 
collective worker organisation is faced with the challenge to identify contents, structures 
and languages to bring together multiple strands of contestation. This is pertinent for the 
present study. In Barchiesi’s view, further research is necessary, to look at the ways in 
which workplace strategies of resistance are still relevant for factory working class 
solidarity that is undoubtedly weakened and fragmented by accelerated restructuring of 
production organisation.  
 
This context, while briefly outlined, serves to locate the present study, which looks not 
only at assembly plant in-plant work and production organisation changes, but also at the 
activities between OEMs and the supply chain – with a consideration of labour and its 
responses.  
 
Globalisation of production by MNCs has also meant increasing fragmentation of value-
adding activities across geographic space and between companies. This seeks to resolve 
impediments to capital accumulation, but it does so by means of strategies that give rise 
to new bases for fresh impediments by creating new sources of power for unions. To this 
end, this study finds particularly Just In Time (JIT) to be a classic case. JIT constitutes 
the dominant logistical system upon which companies increasingly rely in connecting 
fragmented production stages and distribution. JIT has evolved to encompass a similarly 
vulnerable Just In Sequence (JIS). JIT and JIS are discussed in Chapters 4 and 5.   
   
The phenomenon of geographically dispersed and fragmented value-adding production 
activities – in other words, globally outsourced production – makes the coordination of 
linkages between OEMs and their suppliers, and between these suppliers and their 
suppliers, one of the inherent and strategic features of the automotive industry value 
chain in its current state of development. The present study contextualises this in terms of 
the concepts of Global Commodity Chain (GCC) and the logistical revolution. Yet the 
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study comes across something that needs explaining: insourcing. What does it imply after 
the era of rigid outsourcing? This question is explored in Chapters 4 and 5.  
 
1.3. Methodology  
 
In looking at work and production changes in the automotive industry value chain and 
responses by labour, I selected BMW South Africa and a manageable sample of its 
suppliers: Venture, ZF Lemförder and Lear Corporation.  BMW produces popular brands, 
especially among the youth in South Africa. As Masondo (2003) states, the company is 
recognised globally for the quality of its products. Chapter 4 shows that, in the case of 
BMW South Africa, these products are mainly exported to the USA. 
 
The BMW South Africa assembly plant is situated next to Automotive Supplier Park 
(ASP) in the country’s administrative capital, the City of Tshwane. This supplier park, in 
which Lear Corporation (one of the suppliers that form a focus in the present study) has a 
production facility, is one of the developments associated with the MIDP, but in addition 
has developed forms of production organisation such as lean production and its elements 
such as JIT. 
 
As a focus of study, BMW South Africa offered another opportunity; namely, to draw a 
reflective comparison between NUMSA and the largest of its international fraternal 
unions Industriegewerkschaft Metall (IG Metall): the German industrial metalworkers’ 
union. As discussed in Chapter 3, these two unions are the largest in the two countries’ 
metal and related industries, have close ties and, together with BMW (both in South 
Africa and Germany) would provide greater access to labour and its perspectives.  
 
As shown in Chapter 3, Germany is South Africa’s largest trading partner in the 
automotive industry. This trade also takes place within MNCs such as BMW, both in 
terms of components and Complete Built Up (CBU) vehicles. For example, BMW’s 
Rosslyn assembly plant produces one product series; it imports the rest, and, in this, 
BMW in Germany occupies a central role.   
  
 
7 
 
The study was conducted by employing the following methodological activities: a 
literature review; interviews; a research trip to Germany (which included interviews and 
presentations); and reflection on my own extensive involvement in the labour movement 
in South Africa, including work for NUMSA. 
 
The literature review played an important role in the present study. This largely focused 
on relevant books, journal articles and research reports. I also looked at relevant reports 
from NUMSA and BMW South Africa, among others; and I made use of the Internet to 
access information from South African, German and global industry players, including 
industry associations. During the research process I also searched for automotive industry 
news in every academic/research paper and newspaper that I came across, and this 
contributed to formulating approaches regarding the next step. 
 
In South Africa I held interviews with the executive director of the National Association 
of Automotive Component & Allied Manufacturers (NAACAM), Roger Pitot, and with 
one of South Africa’s leading researchers and writers on the automotive industry, Justin 
Barnes. Other important interviews in South Africa included interviews with NUMSA 
shop stewards from Venture, ZF Lemförder and Lear Corporation. At BMW South Africa 
I held two sessions of interviews with NUMSA shop stewards; held a focus group with 
them; attended one of their consultation meetings with the representatives of hourly 
human resource management; and as this study (especially Chapter 4) reflects, I held 
important and invaluable (in terms of information) interviews with plant director Knudt 
Flor.  
 
I originally planned to hold interviews with NUMSA national office bearers. However, 
given that, in my capacity as NUMSA national official based at the union’s head office, I 
participated in meetings directly with national office bearers (or at least with some of 
them), I decided that such contact would suffice for the purposes of the present study. 
These meetings included two Central Committee (CC) meetings (the CC is the union’s 
highest authority, meeting between four-yearly gatherings of the National Congresses or 
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NCs); a mini-NC; national and Gauteng regions’ job security conferences; and meetings 
for the union’s broader project on work and production reorganisation in the automotive 
and components industries.  
 
During this period I was also appointed NUMSA’s acting spokesperson, communicating 
to the public the union’s perspectives, decisions and intentions, and announcing and 
defending its actions. Thereafter, the union appointed me head of Organising, Campaigns 
and Collective Bargaining (OCCB) and (on an acting basis) national coordinator for the 
automotive assembly and tyre manufacturing industries. This whole process provided 
more information than I would have been able to obtain in an interview. 
 
Before being appointed a full-time union official in 2007, I was for just over seven years 
a trainee and worker in an automotive assembly plant, and a shop steward, as well as 
forming part of the union’s automotive industry negotiation team to the National 
Bargaining Forum (NBF). My own experience in the automotive industry was thus 
important in this study as a point of reference. 
 
As part of NUMSA’s much bigger study on the automotive and components industries, 
conducted by the University of the Witwatersrand-based Society, Work and Development 
Institute (SWOP), I formed part of a research visit to Germany. In Germany I participated 
in interviews with and presentations by the BMW Regensburg-Wackersdorf Works 
Council. The Works Councils of BMW Regensburg assembly plant and Wackersdorf 
components supply plant had formed a joint Works Council. As is further reflected in 
Chapter 4, this came about as a result of the Wackersdorf components supply plant 
Works Council responding to pressures in the supply chain. When I returned from 
Regensburg I left a questionnaire behind, which was emailed back to me completed.  
 
I attended interviews with and a presentation by Dr Detlef Gerst, sociologist and director 
of IG Metall’s Work and Production Innovations Department. I also attended and had 
interactive sessions and interviews with Konrad Siegel, an IG Metall official who is 
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renowned as a German specialist in labour economics (International MTM Directorate 
2005). 
 
Further, during the German research visit I formed part of interviews with and 
presentations by the Works Councils of the VW components plant in Kassel, and the 
Daimler-Benz (Mercedes Benz) assembly and components plants in Rastatt and 
Gaggenau. Although VW and Mercedes Benz were not included in my case studies, I 
nevertheless obtained invaluable information from them. This I used in the background 
when analysing facts obtained from my case study and to develop judgments about the 
trends in terms of work and production changes in the automotive industry value chain 
and union responses. 
 
1.4. Structure    
 
This study is divided into five chapters. 
  
Chapter 1 is the introductory chapter, reflecting briefly on the context of this study, and 
outlining the methodology and the structure. 
 
Chapter 2 builds the theoretical framework in which this study is located. In this, Capital 
(Vol. I) by Karl Marx (1990/1867) occupies centre stage. To participate I enrolled under 
Stephen Shapiro (2008) as a student in How to Read Marx’s Capital, in order to augment 
my previous interactions with the book. I draw on further references on Marx, among 
which the contribution of Eddie Webster (1985) is crucial.  
 
In Cast in a Racial Mould: Labour Process and Trade Unionism in the Foundries 
Webster (1985) reflects on Marx so critically that it was difficult for me, as a student, to 
imagine adopting a similar approach. Yet I had to wrestle with the frustrating question: 
What new contribution will I make? It was the organic nature of Marx’s theory, which he 
developed from the constantly changing reality, that got me started on analysing the 
labour process. 
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The basic theme that runs from Chapter 2 onwards is that the capitalist mode of 
production has inherent impediments, which it resolves – but only by means that in turn 
set up new impediments, thus providing workers with fresh grounds for renewing and 
redirecting their resistance to exploitation. This theme also influences the conclusions 
that I draw in Chapter 5 about weak links in the present automotive industry’s superior 
mode of organising work and production. 
  
Chapter 3 looks at the automotive industry generally, and the position and location of 
South Africa and Germany in particular in that industry. Chapter 4 moves from the 
general to the particular, what Marx (1990/1867) termed the hidden abode of production, 
where capital is not only producing, but is itself produced. In this study, this is our 
modern day workplace – the automotive industry’s globalised world of work. Chapter 4 
provides empirical evidence of both how capital is deepening the subordination of labour 
to capital and how, in turn, workers are resisting, using logistical power that capital gives 
them by virtue of JIT and JIS. 
 
Another key theme, then, that runs through this study, is labour’s resistance to 
exploitation; that is, labour’s responses to changes in work and production organisation 
which deepen exploitation and labour’s subordination to capital in the automotive 
industry.  
  
Chapter 5 draws conclusions, partly through a reflective comparison of NUMSA and IG 
Metall. However, throughout, greater emphasis is placed on NUMSA, as the main focus 
of this study, in evaluating labour’s responses to work and production changes in the 
South African automotive industry. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE CAPITALIST MODE OF PRODUCTION: THE LABOUR PROCESS AND 
CHANGES IN WORK AND PRODUCTION GENERALLY 
 
This chapter looks at the theoretical foundations for an analysis of the labour process, in 
which I locate changes in work and production organisation.  
 
2.1. The foundations for an analysis of the labour process, changes in work and 
production organisation 
 
It is now 143 years since Capital (Vol. I) by Karl Marx (1990/1867) was first published. 
Nonetheless, the book remains non-inconsiderable. This arises mainly from the theories 
and concepts that Marx developed, as well as from his analysis of the underpinnings of 
the capitalist mode of production and changes within that mode of production with regard 
to work and production organisation. Marx’s analysis of the labour process and the 
capitalist system of production remains fundamentally convincing.  
 
In Capital (Vol. I) Marx laid the ‘foundations for an analysis of the transformation of the 
labour process’ (Webster 1985: 1). By the ‘labour process’ is meant human ‘purposeful 
activity aimed at the production of use-values’ (Marx 1990/1887: 290). By ‘use-values’ is 
meant products that are useful ‘to supply the necessities, or serve the conveniences of 
human life’ (John Locke 1777, quoted in Marx 1990/1887: 126). Under the capitalist 
mode of production, though, use-values largely take the form of a commodity, which 
Marx analyses in detail in Capital (Vol. I), particularly in Chapters 1–3, and then also in 
Chapters 4–5 (when dealing with money and capital), Chapter 6 (when dealing with the 
sale and purchase of labour-power as a commodity), and generally throughout the book.  
 
According to Marx, use-value is the qualitative aspect of a commodity, with exchange-
value as its quantitative aspect. Capitalist production is not primarily for meeting human 
needs. What capitalists want is the production of use-values only because, and in so far 
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as, they form the material substratum of exchange-value, and are the bearers of exchange-
value (Marx 1990/1887). In this, capitalists have two objectives.  
 
First, capitalists have the objective of subjecting workers to produce a use-value that has 
exchange-value, i.e. an article destined to be sold – a commodity; and second, they want 
that commodity to be greater in value than the sum of the commodities used to produce it, 
namely, the means of production and labour-power (Marx 1990/1887). In this way, the 
capitalist’s aim is not only the production of ‘a use-value, but a commodity; not only use-
value, but value; and not just value, but also surplus-value’ (Marx 1990/1887: 293). 
Commodity exchange leads to the value added during the labour process and thus 
surplus-value being realised, e.g. in money form.  
 
The labour process has three simple elements, namely: ‘(1) purposeful activity, that is 
work itself, (2) the object on which that work is performed, and (3) the instruments of 
that work’ (Marx 1990/1887: 284). Cognisant of the fact that the products of a human 
labour process are visualised first, accordingly, workers interface in this process with the 
instruments of labour in order to effect a purposeful alteration to the objects (materials) 
worked upon. 
 
What is the fundamental reason for the labour process, or production in general? Marx 
(1990/1867) brings to our attention the fact that, in order not only to live but also to work, 
a human being needs the means of subsistence. ‘Just as on the first day of his [/her] 
appearance on the world’s stage, man [referring to a human being] must still consume 
every day, before and while he [/she] produces’ (Marx 1990/1887: 272). Thus the 
production of the means to support human life – the fundamental reason for the labour 
process, or production in general – is at the same time the production of the material life 
itself (Marx 1972/1845, cited in Webster 1985). 
 
Under capitalism, though, economic production largely takes place in the ‘hidden abode 
of production’ (Marx 1990/1887: 279–280) – the capitalist workplace where, according 
to Marx (1990/1867), capital is not only producing but is itself produced. This involves 
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the production and modes for increasing the rate of surplus-value. As such, capitalists 
constantly seek to introduce changes in the labour process in order to increase the rate of 
surplus-value. This is important to underline because changes in the labour process are 
either inextricably linked to or are simultaneously part of changes in work and production 
organisation, which are constantly pursued by capitalists for the same reason. As such, 
changes in work and production organisation cannot be considered in isolation from the 
labour process. 
 
Webster (1985) finds Marx to have been successful in identifying the broad tendency of 
the capitalist system to transform the labour process. Marx’s work ‘remained largely 
unchallenged and, until the 1970s saw a rediscovery of the labour process, undeveloped’ 
(Webster 1985: 6). Clarifying this point, Webster (1985) references Harry Braverman 
(1974). According to Braverman, Marx understood the tendencies of the capitalist mode 
of production and accurately generalised ‘from the as yet meagre instances of his time’, 
to the extent that decades immediately after completing Capital (Vol. I), ‘Marx’s analysis 
seemed adequate to each special problem of the labour process and remarkably faithful to 
the overall movement of [capitalist] production’ (Webster 1985: 6). This fact is said to 
have contributed to dormancy in the study of the labour process among Marxists 
(Braverman 1974, cited in Webster 1985). For this present study, as this chapter 
particularly illustrates, Marx’s work constitutes the central theoretical framework to the 
study of the labour process.  
 
Braverman, argues Webster (1985), contributed much to the renewal of interest in the 
labour process; he took as his point of departure the link between capitalism and work; 
and his major contribution to the understanding of the capitalist labour process since 
Marx is his analysis of ‘scientific management’ – ‘Taylorism’. I return to Taylorism 
along with other forms of work and production organisation in the automotive industry 
value chain as a matter of historical review.  
 
However, there are particular omissions in Braverman’s important contribution that links 
work and capitalism. Webster (1985) points to lack of an account of the way in which the 
  
 
14 
development of machine-based production has generated sources of leverage for effective 
workplace organisation; and neglect of the new bargaining power conferred on unskilled 
and semi-skilled workers when mechanisation replaces craft skill.  
 
Webster (1985) then turns to Marx regarding the above point, worker resistance. 
‘Although class struggle is central to Marx’s analysis of the transformation of the labour 
process, with the exception of Chapter 10 in [Capital] Volume I it is capital and not 
labour that is the central actor’ (Webster 1985: 12). Webster references Harry Cleaver 
(1979), who suggests that what has led to the neglect of worker resistance in the labour 
process is to see in Capital [Vol. I] only abstract laws of motion ‘in that it completely 
ignores the way working class power forces and checks capitalist development’ (Cleaver 
1979: 28, quoted in Webster 1985: 12).  
 
Indeed in Capital (Vol. I) Marx raises the question of worker resistance for the first time 
in Chapter 10, which provides an account of the history of social and political conflict 
over the length of the working day. The establishment of the normal working day, writes 
Marx (1990/1867), was the product of a protracted and more or less concealed civil war 
between the capitalist class and the working class. This working class struggle was 
necessitated by capitalists’ pursuit of absolute surplus-value. Marx (1990/1867) shows 
that capitalists were advancing a boundless and ruthless extension of the working day. 
According to Marx (1990/1867), the English factory workers were the champions in this 
battle, not only of the English, but also of the modern working class of his time in 
throwing down the gauntlet to the theory of capital. His account for this is that the contest 
takes place in the arena of modern industry, and that is why it was fought out first in the 
homeland of that industry – England.   
 
‘It is the English workers who against the pressures of overwork conducted a centuries-
long struggle, going back to the fifteenth century, for laws that limited the working day’ 
(Shapiro 2008: 90). While the English workers achieved successes in limiting the 
working day and securing legislative milestones, it is, according to Marx (1990/1867), 
American workers who, as a fruit of the American Civil War, won the eight-hour 
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working day, which the English working class had been unable to achieve (Shapiro 
2008).  
 
Yet, while Marx (1990/1867) raises the question of worker resistance in Capital (Vol. I) 
for the first time only in Chapter 10, he does not leave it there. Marx takes the question of 
worker resistance further. For example: in Chapter 15 of Capital (Vol. I) Marx 
(1990/1867) deals with machinery and modern industry (of his time) and worker 
responses to the introduction and use of machinery in production. Marx (1990/1867) also 
deals among other things with the struggle between worker and machine. He reflects on 
the numerous resistance struggles in which workers responded to the introduction of 
machinery in the labour process by directing their attack on it. ‘In the seventeenth century 
nearly all Europe experienced workers’ revolt against the ribbon-loom, a machine for 
weaving and lace trimmings’ (Marx 1990/1887: 554). The outcomes include instances 
where machinery was destroyed, faced legislative restrictions or was prohibited, or was 
burned, and even cases of far reaching steps taken against some persons involved in 
inventions or innovations of machinery (Marx 1990/1887). 
 
Marx (1990/1867) finds the struggle between the capitalist and the wage-labourer starting 
with the existence of the capital relation itself, and ranging throughout the period of 
manufacture. It is only since the introduction of machinery that the worker has fought 
against the instrument of labour itself, capital’s material mode of existence (Marx 
1990/1887). This fight broke out as a result of a variety of factors, including what Marx 
(1990/1867) identifies as the most immediate effects of machine production on the 
worker.  
 
Capital appropriates supplementary labour-power. According to Marx (1990/1867), the 
instrument of labour strikes down the worker; and the direct antagonism between the two 
becomes most apparent whenever newly-introduced machinery enters into competition 
with handicrafts or manufactures handed down from former times. When capital 
appropriates supplementary labour-power, among other things work processes are 
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segmented into monotonous tasks that are left to the worker, who is rendered the 
appendage of the machinery. This involves de-skilling.  
 
Further, machinery dispenses with muscle power. Marx (1990/1867) argues that this is 
used by capitalists to effect changes in the age and sex of the workforce, thus shifting to 
the employment of a younger generation of workers, including child labour and women – 
not intentionally for purposes of social transformation but for increased exploitation that 
involves the suppression of wage levels. In Grounding Globalisation: Labour in the Age 
of Insecurity, Webster et al. (2008) find that the shift to the employment of younger 
workers in the South African white goods (e.g. fridges) industry correlates with 
generational tensions between them and the older workers.  
 
Capitalists also use machinery to prolong the working day; for example, by introducing 
the shift system, which adds on night and even weekend work. This is entrenched by the 
competitive struggle between the capitalists themselves, depreciation of machinery and 
the introduction of more effective new inventions. Basically, idling capital represents a 
cost to capitalists, a waste that must be avoided or eliminated.  
 
According to Marx (1990/1867), the prolongation of the working day limits the time 
available to workers as social beings, which includes the time needed for rest, social 
interaction in communities and households, and intellectual development.  
 
Last but not least, capitalists utilise machinery to intensify labour. Under capitalism the 
application of machinery is by no means intended to lighten workers’ toil (Marx 
1990/1887). Rather, capitalists employ machinery as one way of increasing the 
productivity of labour. This is intended to cheapen commodities by shortening ‘necessary 
labour-time’ and lengthening ‘surplus labour-time’ – that part of the working day during 
which workers’ production results in surplus-value expropriated by the capitalists.  
 
By necessary labour-time Marx (1990/1867) refers to the labour-time required to produce 
any use-value under the conditions of production normal for a given society and with the 
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average degree of skill and intensity prevalent at a given time; as well as that part of the 
working day during which workers work for themselves (Marx 1990/1887), carrying out 
production that results in the equivalent of the means of subsistence necessary to support 
their lives. The latter, in other words, relates to the production of commodities equivalent 
to wages. By surplus-value is simply meant the difference between the value of products 
(goods or services) and the value of the elements consumed in the production of such 
products, ‘in other words the means of production and the labour-power’ (Marx 
1990/1887: 317).  
 
Work intensification occurs in one way by decreasing the number of workers and 
redistributing the work of those that are affected among those that are retained. 
Capitalists also tend to reduce the workforce they employ by means of increasing the 
application of machinery. This contributes to the formation of or an increase in the 
industrial reserve army – the so-called surplus population or, simply, the unemployed. 
This is but a further example of capitalists using machinery as an instrument of class 
struggle to increase surplus-value.  
 
Unemployment is crucial in keeping wages down and disciplining workers, asserts 
Webster (1985). For example, if unemployment is high, workers’ struggles over wage 
increments are made to attract less sympathy, as they are portrayed as self-centred, while 
brutal competition for jobs leaves no mercy for those seeking decent wages. 
 
Marx (1990/1867) sums up his reflection on workers’ resistance against machinery by a 
note that it took both time and experience before they learned to distinguish between 
machinery and its employment by capital, and therefore to transfer their attack from the 
machinery to the form of society that utilises it; in other words, from fighting the enemies 
of their enemies to fighting the form of society that their enemies construct also by the 
use of machinery (Marx & Engels 2004/1848). Shapiro (2008) reads Marx as believing 
that labourers erred in not resisting the capitalist mode of production at an earlier point 
when it was less entrenched. In this sense, now when workers resist they often do so less 
to overthrow the system than to soften its hardest edges (Shapiro 2008).  
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Accordingly, ‘struggles over wages within the manufacturing system presuppose 
manufacture; they are in no sense directed against its existence’ (Marx 1990/1887, cited 
by Shapiro 2008: 131). This is not withstanding Marx’s ultimate analysis of the 
contradictory nature of capitalist development generally (for example, in Capital [Vol. I], 
Chapter 32), which is that the overall class struggle between the capitalist class and the 
working class leads to the victory of the latter by challenging the whole structure of class 
exploitation and domination through broader political forms of action.  
 
The ‘“optimistic” prognostication of the revolutionary potential of trade unions’, writes 
Webster (1985: 10–11), without necessarily scrapping it completely from the map, has 
not been confirmed by subsequent developments. This is because, according to Webster 
(1985, drawing on Lane 1974), trade unions were to become the exclusive preserve of the 
aristocratic minority of privileged craft workers. 
 
Yet the capitalist mode of production has inherent impediments, which it resolves – but 
only by means that set up new impediments, thus providing workers with fresh grounds 
for renewing and redirecting their resistance to exploitation. 
 
For instance, writing in Chapter 15 of Capital (Vol. III) about the contradiction between 
extension of production and production of surplus-value (capital valorisation), Marx 
(1991/1894) argues that capitalist production constantly strives to overcome the 
immanent barriers that are embedded in this contradiction, but only by means that set up 
the barriers afresh on a more powerful scale; and that the ‘true barrier’ to capitalist 
production is ‘capital itself’. Coupled with worker resistance to exploitation and broader 
working class struggles this basically explains Marx’s theory of working class victory 
over the capitalist class.  
 
In related analysis, Webster (1985) argues that capitalism’s transformation of the labour 
process from one formation to another is able to overcome impediments in the old, but 
only by generating new impediments in the new. Flowing from this, he argues further that 
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optimistic interpretations of trade unionism cannot be rejected outright. Therefore, 
workers’ resistance cannot be neglected in all of this. Thus any serious, holistic 
examination of changes in work and production cannot escape or neglect the question of 
union responses, and hence the present study.  
 
What one finds important from Marx for purposes of the present study is not only the 
foundation that he laid for analysing transformations of the labour process – and in this 
regard the standing theories and concepts that he developed – but also the conclusions 
that he drew. In this, and directly related to the present study, for example, is the fact that  
‘the evolution of industrial capitalism provided the pre-conditions for collective 
organisation by throwing workers together in large numbers and creating deprivations 
which spurred them to combination’ (Webster 1985: 10). Flowing from this is the further 
point made by Webster (1985), that Marx’s analysis of the revolutionary role of the 
working class was not an article of faith but a materialist account of the contradictory 
nature of capitalist development.  
 
I formerly referred to the point by Marx (1990/1867) that capitalist production is not 
merely the production of commodities but in essence is, by its very nature, the production 
of surplus-value. To return to the question of the two proportions of the working day, 
necessary labour-time and surplus labour-time, as pointed out, one way of increasing 
surplus-value is to increase surplus labour-time by curtailing necessary labour-time. 
Consequently, therefore, capitalists constantly seek to effect changes in the labour 
process, in how work is performed and together with production is organised. This is 
clearly presented thus:  
 
But when surplus-value has to be produced by the conversion of necessary-labour 
into surplus-labour, it by no means suffices for capital to take over the labour 
process in its given or historically transmitted shape, and then simply to prolong 
its duration. The technical and social conditions of the process and consequently 
the mode of production itself must be revolutionised before the productivity of 
labour can be increased. Then, with the increase in the productivity of labour, the 
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value of labour-power will fall, and the portion of the working day necessary for 
the reproduction of that value will be shortened. (Marx 1990/1887: 432) 
 
Writing about the labour process turned into a process whereby capitalists consume 
labour-power, Marx (1990/1867) emphasises two facts. First, workers work under the 
control of the capitalists who own labour-power by buying it. By selling their labour-
power to the capitalists, workers also part with its use in the same way as the use of any 
other commodity belongs to its purchaser. With the use of labour-power belonging to 
them, capitalists basically want it to be used to perform work in a proper manner, 
ensuring that ‘the means of production are applied directly to the purpose, so that the raw 
material is not wasted, and the instruments of labour are spared, i.e. only worn to the 
extent necessitated by their use in the work’ (Marx 1990/1887: 291). Second, the 
commodities produced belong to the capitalists and not their immediate producers, the 
workers (Marx 1990/1887). Thus from the point of view of the capitalists, writes Marx, 
the labour process is nothing more than the consumption of labour-power, which can 
occur only by adding the means of production to it. 
 
All of this, however, it is important to emphasise, does not take place in a vacuum, but 
rather in a situation of unity and conflict of opposites. There is a degree of cooperation 
between workers and capitalists, each one for their own interests, as Marx (1990/1867) 
argues, in a situation that involves conflict arising out of their contrasting interests and 
the ways in which these translate into the labour process and influence the general 
societal relations. 
 
On the one hand, workers own no means of production of their own, as a result of 
historical struggles during which they were divorced from ownership and control of the 
means of production, but are dependent on selling their labour-power for wages in order 
to live. By labour-power, Marx (1990/1867) refers to labour-capacity, or capacity for 
labour – the aggregate of those mental and physical capabilities existing in a physical 
form in a human being, who sets them in motion whenever producing a use-value of any 
kind. On the other hand, capitalists want, and constantly seek ways by which to increase 
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the rate of, surplus-value, which is set in motion for capital accumulation. Wages, which 
workers seek to increase, represent their income but a cost for capitalists; this is the basic 
source of conflict between them (Webster 1985). 
 
Marx (1990/1867) defines the rate of surplus-value that can be increased by curtailing the 
necessary labour-time and altering the respective lengths of the two components 
(necessary labour-time and surplus labour-time) of the working day, as ‘relative surplus-
value’. As also discussed, capitalists can increase the rate of surplus-value by lengthening 
the working day. This he calls, as touched on earlier, absolute surplus-value.  
 
According to Marx (1990/1867) the production of absolute surplus-value turns 
exclusively upon the length of the working-day, while, the production of relative surplus-
value revolutionises the technical processes of labour. Absolute surplus-value and 
relative surplus-value are, however, interrelated (Marx 1990/1867). For example, central 
to the revolutionising of the technical process of labour as driven by the capitalists, is the 
objective of curtailing necessary labour-time by extending surplus labour-time during 
which workers produce surplus-value exclusively for accumulation by the capitalists. 
Marx (1990/1867) finds that once the capitalist mode of production has become the 
established and universal mode of production the difference between relative surplus-
value and absolute surplus-value is felt whenever the rate of surplus-value has to be 
increased 
 
From Marx (1990/1867) it can be seen that faced with impediments to prolonging the 
working day, capitalists were compelled to focus within the fixed working day in order to 
raise the rate of surplus-value; hence a shift from absolute to relative surplus-value. 
Impediments to prolonging the working day include physical and social limits and moral 
obstacles.  For instance, notwithstanding the fact that capitalists constantly seek ways to 
undermine this achievement, workers have successfully resisted the prolongation of the 
working day and ensured that it is fixed. In terms of physical and social limits and moral 
obstacles, Marx (1990/1867) highlights the fact that within 24 hours of a natural day 
workers can only expend a certain quantity of vital force, while also needing to rest and 
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sleep, feed, wash and clothe themselves and, as touched upon earlier, satisfy their 
intellectual and social requirements. 
 
Thus the motive among capitalists for raising the rate of surplus-value and the 
competitive struggles between them for the maximum surplus-value have, among other 
factors, resulted in major transformations in the labour process and the way in which 
work is performed and together with production is organised generally. Marx 
(1990/1867) identifies and looks into three phases of such transformation, namely, 
cooperation, manufacture and machinofacture (machinery and large-scale industry). 
Table 2.1 depicts these phases in terms of Chapters 13–15 of Marx’s Capital (Vol. I). Just 
as the bid to prolong the working day met with impediments and capitalists were 
compelled to devise means within a fixed working day to raise the rate of surplus-value, 
so too each of the three phases identified by Marx (1990/1867) are, writes Webster 
(1985), ‘characterised by a series of impediments to accumulation which are overcome 
by a transformation of the labour process’ (1985: 2), but, as stated formerly, only by 
means that in turn set up new impediments. 
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Table 2.1: Historical phases of work and production changes under capitalism 
Period   Dates    Mode of value creation  Method for creating surplus-value 
Era of Handicrafts: 15th c.–mid-16th c.  Absolute surplus-value: Lengthening of the working day 
Era of Manufacture: Mid-16th c.–18th c.  Relative surplus-value : Cooperation; specialised labour 
Era of Industry:  Last third of 18th c.–1860s Relative surplus-value : Machinery (automation); large-scale industry  
Source: Shapiro (2008: 116) 
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According to Marx (1990/1867) the starting point of capitalist production – cooperation, 
both historically and logically – first occurs when individual capital employs 
simultaneously a comparatively large number of labourers to produce the same sort of 
commodity; and, consequently, when the labour process is carried out on an extensive 
(i.e. large) scale under the command of the capitalist and yields relatively large quantities 
of products. In this way, formal subordination of labour to capital is constituted. 
Transformations in the labour process and, along with them, the reorganisation of work 
and production, lead to real labour subordination to capital, which increases throughout 
the phases that Marx (1990/1867) identifies. 
 
Using these phases as a reference point, real subordination reaches its zenith in the era of 
machinery and large-scale industry. Real subordination is achieved ‘on the basis of a 
series of linked and mutually interdependent developments: the extraction of relative 
surplus-value; the employment of machinery; the conscious application of science and 
technology; the mobility and replacement of labour (the formation of the reserve army of 
labour); and large scale production’ (Brighton Labour Process Group, summed up in 
Webster 1985: 9). Webster (1985) also writes that real subordination is, however, never 
complete. He points out that in calling capital due to labour-power (wages, for instance) 
‘variable capital’, Marx made it clear that surplus-value is not determined in a mechanical 
way; and that, if powerful enough, employers can increase surplus-value; while, if strong 
enough, workers can vary it.  
 
Cooperation therefore constitutes, according to Marx (1990/1867) read holistically, not 
only the starting point of capitalist production but also – on a concentrated basis – of the 
accompanying social relations such as worker resistance, which are also directed at 
influencing the variations of variable-capital and surplus-value. 
 
In terms of work and production organisation, cooperation can hardly be distinguished in 
its earliest stages from the earlier handicraft trades era, except by the greater number of 
workers simultaneously employed by the same individual capital (Marx 1990/1887). As 
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illustrated in Table 2.1, absolute surplus-value is the mode of value creation that 
characterised the emergence of cooperation. 
 
While cooperation is able to overcome some of the impediments (Webster 1985) 
characterising the handicraft era, it also creates the potential for resistance to capital as 
the number of cooperating workers increases (Marx 1990/1887). In this, ‘the control 
exercised by the capitalist is not only a special function arising from the nature of the 
social labour process, but it is at the same time a function for the exploitation of a social 
labour process, and is consequently conditioned by the unavoidable antagonism’ (Marx 
1990/1887: 449) between the capitalist and workers. This antagonism is inherent ‘in the 
nature of capitalism where the driving motive is maximisation of surplus-value’ (Webster 
1985: 3). 
 
Cooperation laid the basis for, and was followed by a transformation of work and 
production organisation to, the phase of manufacture. As reflected in Table 2.1, according 
to Marx (1990/1867) manufacture extends roughly ‘from the middle of the sixteenth 
century to the last third of the eighteenth century’ (Shapiro 2008: 105). Arising out of 
cooperation, manufacture necessarily develops and entrenches division of labour. To 
illustrate this fact, Marx (1990/1867) looks at the production of carriages. He writes that 
carriages were formerly a product of a great number of independent craft workers but that 
under manufacture all these craft workers are assembled in one building where the 
unfinished product passes from hand to hand, one stage to another in a flow of segmented 
work organisation. Consequently, this leads to de-skilling as handicrafts are decomposed 
into their different partial processes (Marx 1990/1887). This generates another feature of 
manufacture.  
 
Out of decomposed handicrafts, capitalists recruit labourers to perform smaller segments 
of a process that makes a commodity (Shapiro 2008). On the one hand, the skilled craft 
workers, artisans, in this way find their trades undermined; on the other, the addition of 
more and more semi-skilled and unskilled labourers associates them both socially and 
organisationally. Thus the transformation of work and production organisation from 
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cooperation only gives rise to new impediments to the production and accumulation of 
surplus-value, which under manufacture increasingly takes the form of relative surplus-
value (see Table 2.1). 
 
Marx (1990/1867) then turns to machinery and large-scale industry (machinofacture), 
which represents a shift from manufacture as a result of its impediments to the capitalist’s 
pursuit of maximum surplus-value. Marx’s (1990/1867) distinction between manufacture 
and machinofacture in terms of the transformation of work and production organisation is 
that the former takes as its starting point, labour-power, while the latter takes as its 
starting point, the development and application of the instruments of labour.  
 
In treating the subject of worker resistance in the labour process, I earlier reflected on 
Marx’s analysis of the impediments that emerge with the increased application of 
machinery and the forms of worker resistance necessarily arising as a result.  
 
Machinofacture intensifies relative surplus-value (see Table 2.1) and leads to the 
transformation of the production process to the initial phases of our modern day industry, 
which is characterised by automaton: ‘the name Marx (1990: 502) gives for a “system of 
machinery” as soon as it becomes a conglomerated, “self-acting prime mover”’ (Shapiro 
2008: 121). According to Marx (1990/1867) the automaton becomes all the more perfect, 
the more the production process as a whole becomes a continuous one whereby the raw 
material is effected in its passage from the first phase to the last not by the hand of the 
worker, but by the machinery itself.  
 
Marx’s distinction between the eras of manufacture and machinofacture (in its developed 
form, the era of the automaton) is basically that in the former, the isolation of each 
special process is a condition imposed by the division of labour itself; whereas in the 
latter, the continuity of the special process is the regulating principle. Taking the 
distinction further, Marx (1990/1867) writes that in a fully developed factory, ‘along with 
the tool, the skill of the worker in handling it passes over to the machine’ (1990/1887: 
454). The latter is unlike in the case of manufacture, where the worker handles the tool. 
  27 
‘This increasing reliance on machinery ultimately makes all the factory’s workers equal, 
since it erases the hierarchies of skilled and unskilled labour’ (Shapiro 2008: 129) that 
characterise manufacture. 
 
2.2. Changes in work and production organisation: our modern day automotive 
manufacturing industry in historical perspective  
 
Our modern day automotive industry reflects the state-of-the-art automaton. This applies 
both to automotive assembly and components manufacturing plants, with a few 
exceptions of labour-intensive production in the latter. In addition, the production process 
is continuous not just within plants, but also between assembly plants and components 
manufacturing plants, which supply the means of production (mainly in the form of 
discrete parts or components) to assembly plants. In this, logistics make up one of the 
critical elements that play an important role in the mode of production. Some historical 
reflection is required, with a consideration of where our modern day industry comes from 
in terms of changes in work and production.  
 
In their study of the automotive industry, James P Womack, Daniel T Jones and Daniel 
Roos (1990) look at the industry’s transformations in work and production organisation. 
In The Machine That Changed the World: The Story of Lean Production a key argument 
is that in order to become competitive the industry had to transform work and production 
organisation from craft production to a mass production regime and from the latter to lean 
production. All of these production regimes generally fall within the broad 
transformations of the labour process that Marx identified (see Table 2.1 and related 
reflections) and analysed, as well as the associated propelling motive – the production 
and increase in the rate of surplus-value. 
 
When discussing handicraft production earlier, I reflected on its basic elements as 
articulated by Marx (1990/1867). The framework remains the same; for example, 
Womack et al. (1990) write that ‘a craft producer1 uses highly skilled workers and simple 
                                                 
1
 This presupposes a capitalist. 
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but flexible tools to make what the consumer asks for’ (1990: 12–13). With respect to 
automotive vehicle production specifically, Womack et al. (1990) argue that under craft 
production, the following applied: 
 Most parts and much of the vehicle’s design came from small design shops, with 
the system coordinated by an owner (entrepreneur) in direct contact with 
everyone involved (customers, employers and suppliers).  
 General-purpose machines were the main instruments of labour, used for drilling, 
grinding, and other operations on metal or wood. 
 There were very low production volumes (1 000 or fewer a year), of which only a 
few were built to the same design. In terms of quality, under craft production, 
few of the few automotive vehicles that did have the same design did not 
necessarily have the same dimensions, since craft techniques inherently produced 
variations. 
 Goods produced by craft method, as automotive vehicles once were exclusively, 
cost too much.  
 
Without looking at worker resistance, which is generally not given much (if any) 
attention in their work, Womack et al. (1990) conclude that the solution to these 
impediments within craft production was the development of mass production in the 
twentieth century.  
 
According to Webster (1985) the emergence of mass production deepened the tendency 
towards greater control over labour by capital. Capital did not realise such levels of 
control under craft production. This constituted one of the impediments to accumulation.  
 
The role that Henry Ford of Ford Motor Company (FMC) played in the development of 
mass production, otherwise known after him as Fordism, is widely acknowledged and 
analysed. Among others Webster (1985), Womack et al. (1990), Jarvis (1999) and 
Masondo (2003) reflect in varying degree and emphasis on mass production, which has 
‘mass consumption’ as one of its elements. The latter arose out of cheapened prices of 
automotive vehicles as a result of higher productivity levels of mass (as compared to 
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craft) production; and, in the case of FMC, also out of comparatively higher wages. But 
how did mass production realise higher productivity?  
 
The continuous assembly line played a significant role in mass production, in terms of 
both the social and technical organisation of work and production. Ford adopted 
Frederick Winslow Taylor’s principles of what he called scientific management, 
otherwise known after him, as previously mentioned, as Taylorism (Jarvis 1999; 
Masondo 2003; Webster 1985). This was to make mass production successful, argues 
Jarvis (1999). Taylor’s principles of scientific management can be summarised from 
Jarvis (1999: 24), Webster (1985: 7–8) and Womack et al. (1990: 30–37) as follows. 
 
First, managers had to gather all the traditional knowledge that previously had been 
possessed by workers, and classify and tabulate this knowledge, reducing it to rules, laws 
and formulae. Webster (1985) calls this ‘the dissociation of the labour process from the 
skills of the workers’ (1985: 7). In the past, workers had kept this knowledge from 
employers, an act described by Taylor as ‘soldiering’ (Webster 1985). This was one of 
the impediments to the production of capital. 
 
Second, brain and manual work had to be separated. Workers were left with manual work 
– according to Womack et al. (1990), they were to keep their heads down and think about 
other things. All possible brain work had to be removed from production lines, and be 
centralised elsewhere; for example, in a planning and layout department, as the 
responsibility of industrial engineers. Webster (1985) calls this ‘the principle of the 
separation of conception from execution’ (1985: 7). In all of this, according to Jarvis 
(1999), supervisors were tasked to exert discipline over workers. 
 
Taylorism aside for a bit: Ford’s moving conveyor not only created an enabling 
environment for uninterrupted production flow on a technical basis, but also facilitated a 
transformation in the technical conditions of production towards a technological 
revolution, in which increased use of machinery and automation play a significant role. 
The uninterrupted production flow and constant development of this automaton – as 
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Marx would call it – have a role in disciplining workers. For instance, about the moving 
conveyor, Womack et al. (1990) write that workers were to be ‘relentlessly disciplined by 
the pace of the line, which speeded up the slow and slowed down the speedy’ (1990: 31–
32). Moreover, discipline over workers included treating them as being ‘as replaceable as 
parts on the car’ (Womack et al. 1990: 32).  
 
The breakdown of skilled jobs, the entrenchment of repetitive tasks and increases in line 
speed by management contributed to the treatment of workers as being as replaceable on 
production lines as parts on the car, to work intensification, and to productivity. Linked 
with all of this, Womack et al. (1990) write that ‘the complete, consistent 
interchangeability of parts [components] and the simplicity of attaching them to each 
other…were the manufacturing innovations that made the assembly line possible’ (1990: 
27).    
 
To return to our summary of Taylorism: finally, managers had to plan the work of every 
worker beforehand, and reduce this to written instructions, describing the detailed tasks to 
be accomplished, and specifying work motions to detail and prohibit any deviations 
(Jarvis 1999; Webster 1985). In this, complex work is subdivided into classifications, 
each made of simplified, repetitive tasks, with time and motion studies conducted to set a 
time standard for each task (Jarvis 1999).  
 
On the question of time, Ford is said (Beynon 1973, quoted in Webster 1985) to have put 
it thus: ‘the ideal is the man [worker] must have every second necessary but not a single 
second unnecessary’ (1985: 8). In terms of subdivision of complex tasks into 
classification, with each task simplified and repetitive tasks entrenched, for example, 
Womack et al. (1990) write that ‘the assembler at Ford…had only one task – to put two 
nuts on two bolts or perhaps to attach one wheel to each car’ (1990: 31). Decomposed 
skilled jobs and intensified division of labour necessarily reduced the duration of training 
for workers to a minimum. The latter, according to Jarvis (1999), was linked to another 
principle: the hiring of unskilled workers into subdivided classifications. 
 
  31 
Years before conceiving of this study, I was trained under an apprenticeship system and 
thereafter worked in an engineering discipline in an automotive industry assembly plant, 
for a combined period of just over seven years. The empirical evidence gained from my 
personal experience confirms all of the above, notwithstanding a few changes that have 
taken place since the advent of Fordist-Taylorist production regimes – mass production in 
its developed form. 
   
What is scientific about Taylor’s ‘principles of scientific management’? This is a 
question for fuller consideration elsewhere, but it is important to allow it to flow from a 
critical examination. Most of the things in the Taylorist regime, incorporated in a further 
developed Fordism, have been about capital exercising control (Masondo 2003; Webster 
1985) in order to raise the productivity of labour, in turn to increase the rate of surplus-
value, and therefore the production and accumulation of more capital. About this question 
broadly on the capitalist mode of production Marx (1990/1867) writes: 
 
Capitalist production is not merely the production of commodities; it is, by its 
very essence, the production of surplus-value. The worker produces not for 
himself [/herself], but for capital. It is no longer sufficient, therefore, for him 
[/her] to simply produce. He [/she] must produce surplus-value. The only worker 
who is productive is one who produces surplus-value for the capitalist, or in other 
words contributes towards the self-valorisation of capital. (Marx 1990/1887: 644) 
 
For Marx (1990/1867), the above context makes it not a piece of good fortune but rather 
a piece of misfortune to be a productive worker. No wonder trade unions could have 
divided discourses on productivity engagements and collaboration.  
 
As a result of improvements in the productivity of labour, writes Webster (1985: 8), by 
1925 Ford had created an organisation that produced almost as many automotive vehicles 
in a single day as it had at first produced in an entire year. Womack et al. (1990: 29) 
record this to have reached a peak of 2 million similar automotive vehicles (Model T) a 
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year. Despite this productivity success, though, mass production generated its own 
impediments. 
 
Mass production’s exercise of technical control and transformation of the technical 
conditions of production in general, including constant development of what Marx called 
the automaton, linked together the relatively homogeneous labour – unskilled and semi-
skilled workers (Webster 1985). As a result of this development, writes Edwards (1979, 
quoted in Webster 1985): ‘when the line stopped every worker necessarily joined the 
strike. The combination proved to be exceptionally favourable for building unions’ 
(1985: 13–14). According to Webster (1985), by increasing the proportion of workers 
strategically involved in mechanised production, the regime also increased the bargaining 
power of a large section of the workforce, and facilitated industrial unionism as a new 
form of unionism, or the mass-production union movement as Womack et al. (1990) call 
it in the case of the USA, and taking United Auto Workers (UAW) as an example. 
 
This union movement was to take charge of coordinating workers’ resistance to and 
engagement with capitalists. However, Womack et al. (1990) suggest that, in the case of 
the UAW, the union’s ‘leadership fully accepted both the role of management and the 
inherent nature of work in an assembly-line factory’ (1990: 42–43). In this, the union’s 
main issues were seniority and job rights. According to Womack et al. (1990) this union 
movement was called ‘job-control unionism’. The question of seniority was, according to 
Womack et al. (1990), partly influenced by the cyclical nature of the automotive industry, 
which meant that companies would retrench workers during downturns. In such 
circumstances, the question of who would go and who would stay becomes important to 
workers. In the South African context this is institutionalised in such retrenchment 
criteria as Last in First Out (LIFO) and with skills retention.  
 
On a daily basis unions play a role in facilitating worker responses to conditions of work 
and production, and in engaging companies on these issues. As key players, then, unions 
must be included when considering changes in work and production. 
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Another impediment to mass production lay, according to Womack et al. (1990), in mass 
production’s organisation and coordination of production. They suggest that this applied 
particularly to the way in which mass production related to the manufacture and 
coordination of supplies of the means of production in the form of parts and components 
that go into the assembly of Complete Build Up (CBU) vehicles.  
 
The bulk of the automotive vehicle production process ‘involves engineering and 
fabricating more than 10,000 discrete parts and assembling these into perhaps 100 major 
components – engines, transmissions, steering gears, suspensions, and so forth’ (Womack  
et al. 1990: 58). They argue that, under mass production, assembly plant companies –
Original Equipment Manufacturers or OEMs – found it a challenge to coordinate this 
process so that everything comes together at the right time with high quality and low cost. 
This is among the reasons for the emergence of lean production and the logistical 
revolution.  
 
Ford sought to achieve complete vertical integration – ‘Do it all yourself in your own 
company’ – while Alfred Sloan of General Motors (GM) advocated decentralised 
components production and supply divisions that functioned as independent profit centres 
– ‘Do it all in your own company, but set up decentralised parts-making divisions as 
independent profit centres’ (Womack  et al. 1990: 138). Sloan, write Womack et al. 
(1990), ‘had a solution to the problem of the cyclical car market as well: When the 
market slumps, lay off workers in the supply system just as you lay off workers in the 
assembly plant’ (1990: 139). Continuing efforts by Ford to overcome the impediments of 
components manufacture and supply led to FMC in the 1950s shifting to an ‘arm’s 
length’ approach to production and components supply: placing out to bid components 
that were formerly supplied from within (Womack et al. 1990). In this, suppliers were 
given detailed drawings and asked for prices per part; the lowest bidder generally won a 
one-year contract. This led to an attack on wages in the supply chain. According to 
Womack et al. (1990) these suppliers were laid off in the form of cancelled contracts 
when the market slumped, just as workers were. 
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Womack et al. (1990) find that in the 1980s mass production automotive companies 
around the world were using both of the approaches developed by FMC and GM. In this, 
the latter was the most integrated, with about 70 per cent of the parts in each car and 
truck supplied by in-house parts divisions. According to Womack et al. (1990), the mid-
1980s saw many OEMs outsourcing the production and supply of parts, and in the USA 
the UAW resisted this change in production organisation. They argue, however, that a 
competitive consideration is not whether parts come from inside or outside an OEM, but 
how it works together with its suppliers. 
 
The resistance of unions depending on context notwithstanding, the industry as it stands 
today reflects a web of what Gary Gerreffi (1994) would in his ‘Global Commodity 
Chain’ (GCC) analysis call producer-driven commodity chains. In this, OEMs wield 
power. The dispersal of production and reorganisation of the automotive industry value 
chain into supply tiers generally result from outsourcing. While this was an old 
phenomenon (Womack et al. 1990), the 1980s were to mark an era of heightened 
outsourcing, which carried on into the 1990s and 2000s. For instance, in South Africa 
cases of outsourcing still persisted at the time of this study.  
 
The intense form of outsourcing in the automotive industry is called modular consortium. 
Robert Collins, Kimberly Bechler and Silvio Pires (1997) characterise a modular 
consortium as an outsourced production organisation where:  
 
 the suppliers assume responsibility for modular assembly, the on-line final 
module assembly into the vehicle, an investment stake in the operation and 
the management of the module supplier chain; and  
 the automotive manufacturer provides the plant and assembly line, and 
assumes the responsibility for plant coordination and final testing. (Collins 
et al. 1997: 499) 
 
This is basically in-house outsourced production. Collins et al. (1997) looked at Skoda’s 
facilities in the Czech Republic, and VW’s truck and bus plant in Resende, Brazil, as part 
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of latest experiments with regard to a modular consortium approach. In a different but 
related study, Roberto Marx, Mauro Zilbovicius and Mario Sergio Salerno (1997) found 
that the modular consortium concept in VW’s Resende plant was based on the transfer of 
all assembly operations to 9 first tier suppliers chosen from among 47 bidders. Collins et 
al. (1997) emerged from their study convinced that modular consortium was the route 
that the automotive industry would take.  
 
Justin Barnes (interview), one of South Africa’s leading writers on the automotive 
industry, argues that final assembly plant companies have for the most part not shifted in 
the direction of modular consortium; and that this is because the Toyota Production 
System (TPS), called lean production by Womack et al. (1990), is still proving a superior 
way of organising production. Further, Barnes points out that a modular consortium has 
greater risk exposures, for example, in terms of investment and the quality of the 
production process. From his experience of working in the South African automotive 
industry, Barnes holds that it is not only OEMs that have increasingly moved towards the 
adoption of lean production (or at least adapting elements of lean production for inclusion 
in their production systems), but that suppliers too are progressively doing the same. In 
terms of suppliers, he argues that there are companies in South Africa that already have 
certain ‘world class’ lean production elements although there are very few of them that 
can be said to be holistically ‘world class’ in lean production standards generally.    
 
Coupled with lean production, the shift from mass to flexible production partly 
contributed to the emergence of what Bonacich and Wilson (2008) call the logistics 
revolution. This general shift away from a mass to a flexible production regime was to 
offer consumers greater product variety.  
 
However, as with all other transformations in the labour process, or changes in work and 
production organisation generally, that have been and are being driven by capitalists, at 
the centre of the shift from a mass to a flexible production regime lies the same motive 
that Marx exposed and articulated: the production of and increase in the rate of surplus-
value for the sake of increased capital accumulation.    
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Lean production emerged and gradually developed after World War II Japan’s 
ascendance to a position of economic significance  (Womack et al. 1990); and with the 
general ‘rise of Japanese companies in [the] 1960s, and their rapid achievement of “best 
practice” status [which] was premised both on an update and an innovation of the Fordist-
Taylorist processes’ (Barchiesi 1997: 44). Of the Japanese companies, Toyota developed 
lean production as an alternative to the capital accumulation impediments of the mass 
production regime; and this, argue Womack et al. (1990), has contributed significantly to 
the company’s success so far in the competitive struggle.  
 
Lean production effected changes in work and production organisation, not only in the 
assembly plant but also down the value chain in the supply linkages. Increasingly, lean 
production – or at least elements thereof – has been or is being adopted not only in the 
automotive industry value chain but across industries and borders. It has become one of 
the non-inconsiderable global production regimes.  
 
Womack et al. (1990) called it ‘lean’ because, compared to mass production, its 
orientation is unceasingly to use less of everything required in production. This includes, 
for example, less of the workforce, as well as fewer supplies, fewer engineering hours to 
develop a new product, and less inventory (which it seeks to eliminate), manufacturing 
space, investment in tools and etc. (Womack et al. 1990). According to Womack et al. 
(1990), again compared to mass production ‘which sets a limited goal – “good enough”, 
which translates into an acceptable number of defects; a maximum acceptable level of 
inventories; [and] a narrow range of standardised products’ (1990: 13), lean production 
aims for perfection: continually declining costs, continuous and incremental improvement 
(kaizen in Japanese), zero quality defects, and identification and elimination of waste – 
muda in Japanese. 
 
Lean production does not aim only at manual labour, which mass production separated 
from brain work. Instead it also targets brain work in all categories of workers. Lean 
production sets up in-plant structures and ways to gather workers’ suggestions on a 
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continual basis (for example, as reflected in Masondo 2003); these suggestions are 
filtered down, with those that stand to benefit the company being selected. These 
structures and approaches include grouping workers into production teams with a team 
leader rather than a foreman (Womack et al. 1990). 
 
In terms of components manufacturing and supply, lean production OEMs keep closer 
contact with their suppliers, for instance, by maintaining equity stakes in some if not most 
or all of their suppliers; these suppliers in turn have cross holdings in each other 
(Womack et al. 1990). This phenomenon partly contributes to making up what in 
Japanese is called keiretsu (original emphasis) (Womack et al. 1990). The selection of 
suppliers in this context is thus based on long-term relationships and profit share 
(Womack et al. 1990).  
 
It is in that way that lean production OEMs involve their suppliers in product 
development and facilitate the sharing of information between them, as opposed, argue 
Womack et al. (1990), to mass production, where suppliers do not have to share 
information because this might jeopardise each one’s competitiveness. Lean production 
reorganises production down the value chain into ‘supplier tiers’: first tier suppliers, 
second tier suppliers, third tier suppliers and so on. All suppliers from second tier 
suppliers backwards are mainly suppliers of suppliers in the value chain. Chapter 4 looks 
at this further and uses the case of BMW South Africa as an example to sketch a picture 
of a typical automotive industry value chain.  
 
Comparing mass production to lean production, Womack et al. (1990) argue that the 
latter uses fewer suppliers than the former. However, the reduction of suppliers under 
lean production can occur in such a manner that it potentially negatively affects labour. 
This might occur due to loss of contracts leading to job losses and a decline in union 
membership, a problematic that Womack et al. (1990) do not unpack. 
  
While maintaining a drive for constant in-plant changes in work and production 
organisation to increase the rate of surplus-value, OEMs have thus moved beyond this to 
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using the supply chain to maximise surplus-value. On this subject, Bonacich and Wilson 
(2008) write that under the logistics revolution the supply network has become an 
important unit of competition.  
 
By the logistics revolution Bonacich and Wilson (2008) are referring to the coordination 
of the entire supply chain, which encompasses design and ordering, production, 
transportation and warehousing, sales, redesign and reordering. The strategic objective of 
the logistics revolution in both the backward and forward linkages of a value 
(commodity) chain is to have the inventory needed ‘in terms of both quantity and the mix 
of goods’ at the specified time in order that a company ‘can avoid the twin dangers of 
overstocks and under-stocks’ (Bonacich & Wilson 2008: 3–4). This has firmly positioned 
Just In Time (JIT) – an element of lean production – as among the central governance 
instruments in the automotive industry value chain. 
 
The logistics revolution is correlated with, among other things, changes in the character 
of production, which affect workers and their unions; and generally, as touched upon 
earlier, a shift from a mass to a flexible production regime (Bonacich & Wilson 2008). 
The authors reveal the direction that changes in work and production organisation take 
under flexible production. They argue that flexible production encompasses a wide range 
of changes in the production process, which include contingent production and, as also 
already mentioned, outsourcing or contracting out. Barchiesi (1997) has an important 
addition to this (drawing on Sethi & Sethi 1990) on what flexibility further implies for 
workers. Flexibility as a concept, he writes, ‘emphasises workers’ capacity to adapt to 
rapidly diversifying production requirements responding to short-time market 
fluctuations, operating on multiple tasks and activating self-inspection and 
communication with upstream phases of the process’ (1997: 3). 
 
Bonacich and Wilson (2008) argue that outsourcing is correlated with offshore 
production. In terms of this, once firms begin to outsource production, there is no need to 
keep it closer; seeking the cheapest labour and having it produce under oppressed 
conditions become competitive activities. Linked to this, in terms of the South African 
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automotive industry, Barnes (2000) highlights the fact that with the adoption of the Motor 
Industry Development Programme (MIDP) and with global integration, South African 
OEMs were no longer compelled to procure components locally, as in previous schemes 
in line with the requirements regarding local content. Rather, OEMs in South Africa 
could now engage in offshore component procurement. In this way, global integration 
posed a challenge not only to local component manufacturing but also to workers in the 
supply chain, as OEMs’ activities governing the supply chain forced suppliers to adopt 
ways by which they might survive the competitive struggle.  
 
The challenge posed to workers by offshore production (and, in fact, all other outsourced 
production) notwithstanding, the geographic dispersion of production and, similarly, the 
fragmentation of value-adding activities between companies, do provide unions with new 
sources of power.  Webster et al. (2008) present a summary of sources of power provided 
to workers in advancing their resistance to exploitation. For the purpose of the present 
study it suffices to highlight three: associational power, structural power and logistical 
power. By centrally assembling large numbers of workers to carry out production, capital 
constitutes a source of both associational power and structural power. Associational 
power results from the formation of collective organisation such as a union, and structural 
power results from the location of workers in the economic system (Webster et al. 2008). 
Further, structural power is subdivided into subtypes. 
 
Webster et al. (2008) reference Erik Olin Wright (2000) to identify these subtypes of 
structural power: market bargaining power and workplace bargaining power. The former 
results from tight labour markets, the latter from the location of a particular group of 
workers within a key industrial sector (Webster et al. 2008). Another source of structural 
power is located in logistics systems, and this is referred to as logistical power (Webster 
et al. 2008). The spatial fragmentation of production and the segmentation of value-
adding activities between OEMs and suppliers provide unions with sources of logistical 
power. In this respect, the present study points to the vulnerabilities inherent in JIT and 
JIS as such sources of logistical power available to unions as stated in Chapter 1, this is 
further discussed in Chapter 4. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY IN GENERAL: THE LOCATION AND 
POSITION OF SOUTH AFRICA AND GERMANY 
 
This chapter looks into the automotive industry in general and the positions in it of South 
Africa and Germany. As reflected in Chapter 1, the case studies of this present study in 
terms of both companies and unions fall within these countries of the South and the North 
respectively.  
 
3.1. The ‘industry of industries’ in transition 
  
In The Concept of the Corporation Peter Drucker (1946) conceptualises the automotive 
industry as ‘the industry of industries’. This has since received much attention in analyses 
of the industry’s value chain.  
 
In Chapter 1 of The Machine That Changed the World: The Story of Lean Production, 
Womack et al. (1990) draw upon Drucker (1946) to begin their analysis of the 
automotive industry as ‘the industry of industries in transition’ (1990: 11). In this, the 
transitional nature of the automotive industry is located in the context of a constant 
change in the labour process, within and between assembly plant companies (Original 
Equipment Manufacturers, or OEMs), suppliers and countries. Connected to this is the 
automotive industry’s enormous influence over other industries, and significant 
contribution to the position of countries in the world economy.  
 
Womack et al. (1990) find the automotive industry’s leading role in effecting changes in 
work and production organisation transcending other industries within and across borders 
by way of being emulated. 
 
With regard to the economic position of countries in the world economy, Barnes (2008) 
points out that the other reason why the automotive industry is considered the industry of 
industries is largely because it has been the bedrock of the manufacturing industry in the 
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USA, Japan and various parts of Western Europe2 since the end of World War II. Linked 
to this, which is actually about the strategic importance of the automotive industry, 
Womack et al. (1990) suggest that the rise of the USA to dominance over the world 
economy after World War I, and Japan’s rise to its current economic prominence, are 
both partly due to the leading role of these two countries’ automotive industries in 
effecting changes in work and production organisation.  
 
The US-based Ford Motor Company (FMC) and General Motors (GM) moved 
(automotive) production from craft to mass production, and Japan-based Toyota 
pioneered lean, flexible production. Both these changes were emulated in other industries 
within the US and Japan respectively, and in the automotive and other industries in other 
countries the world over. Increased labour productivity is among the other results of these 
transitions or transformations.  
 
Considering the automotive industry as the industry of industries, Barnes and Hartogh 
(2009) make an important observation. In KwaZulu-Natal Automotive Industry Strategy 
Report, Barnes and Hartogh (2009) identify the automotive industry’s ‘multiplier effects 
into a wide range of other manufacturing- and service-related sectors’ (2009: 6).  
 
Indeed, the automotive industry’s multiplier effects extend into retail, both of Complete 
Built Up (CBU) vehicles and of components (modules and discrete parts); finance; 
insurance; service stations and repair shops, including automotive body repairs; filling 
stations (fuel and oil) and so on.  
 
In terms of components and other inputs that go into a CBU, we find among the obvious 
distinguishing features, design, colour and shape. We also come across, for example, 
glass and wheels. Just from vehicles’ appearance therefore (before getting inside or 
underneath, or opening boot and bonnet), one can begin to identify the industries that are 
involved in the production and reproduction of automotive vehicles. This would include 
                                                 
2
 In terms of Western Europe, I later draw reference from quantitative data to illustrate the point that 
Germany is the central player. 
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the following industries: paint production; glass production; iron and steel production; 
metals engineering; and tyre manufacturing. The many other components and features 
will, when considered, expand this list further. Linked to this, in A Commodity Chains 
Framework for Analysing Global Industries, Gereffi (1999) cites important quantitative 
data from Hill (1989): ‘In the 1980s, the average Japanese automaker’s production 
system, for example, contained 170 first-tier, 4,700 second-tier, and 31,600 third-tier 
subcontractors [suppliers]’ (Gereffi 1999: 1). 
 
Another intervention in looking at the automotive industry as the industry of industries 
comes from Timothy Sturgeon and Richard Florida (2000). In Globalisation and Jobs in 
the Automotive Industry, Sturgeon and Florida (2000) find that the automotive industry is,  
 
an industry in profound transition: from an older ‘domestic’ model of competition 
that allowed automakers to compete by exporting from supply-bases rooted in 
their home countries, to an emerging ‘global’ model of competition that 
increasingly demands day-to-day production functions be organised on a regional 
and global basis; from an industry that once treated emerging markets as dumping 
grounds for old models and production equipment, to an industry that is building 
leading-edge productive capacity in far-flung corners of the globe; from an 
export-led industry where firms from different countries competed mainly 
through markets, to a network-led industry with each major firm producing within 
each major market. (Sturgeon & Florida 2000: 92) 
 
While dealing with many other aspects of work and production organisation and markets 
with reference to the automotive industry, the findings of Sturgeon and Florida (2000) 
can also be located in the automotive industry’s economic geography in relation to the 
distinction and interrelationship between internationalisation and globalisation.  
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3.2. The automotive industry, internationalisation and globalisation 
 
According to Dicken (1998), ‘internationalisation processes involve the simple extension 
of economic activities across national boundaries’ (1998: 5). As such, internationalisation 
‘is, essentially, a quantitative process which leads to a more extensive geographical 
pattern of economic activity’ (Dicken 1998: 5). On the other hand, globalisation 
processes ‘involve not merely the geographic extension of economic activity across 
national boundaries but also – and more importantly – the functional integration of such 
internationally dispersed activities’. In this way, globalisation is ‘qualitatively different 
from internationalisation’ (Dicken 1998: 5). This notwithstanding, the two are 
interrelated in terms of world-scale geographic spread of economic activity and, 
according to Dicken (1998), they also coexist. Nevertheless, functional integration of 
geographically dispersed economic activities (e.g. production of goods and services) 
makes globalisation more recent than internationalisation (Dicken 1998). 
 
Gereffi (1999) argues in general terms that internationalisation ‘has been a prominent 
feature of the world economy since at least the seventeenth century when colonial 
empires began to carve up the globe in search of raw materials and new markets for their 
manufactured exports’ (1999: 1). ‘Firms internationalise when they invest in new 
offshore production capacity that is discrete from domestic capacity’ (Florida & Sturgeon 
2000: 20). Florida and Sturgeon trace internationalisation in the automotive industry to 
the 1800s: ‘Production of German Daimler motor cars began under licence in France in 
1891; Coventry, England in 1896; and New York City [USA] in 1907’ (Sturgeon & 
Florida 2000: 21). 
 
Sturgeon and Florida (2000) cite GM’s investments in Europe as being a good example 
of the early internationalisation. In this, GM’s operations ‘began with acquisitions of 
local firms (Opel and Vauxhall) that continued to develop, manufacture, and sell a set of 
products that were almost completely distinct from those developed and produced by the 
parent company’s home operations’ (Sturgeon & Florida 2000: 20). GM established its 
first production facility outside the USA in 1907 in Canada, only a year after its 
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founding, following FMC, which had done the same in 1904. Womack et al. (1990) 
highlight another consideration in terms of FMC. By 1926, FMC was assembling 
automotive vehicles in more than 19 foreign countries; and by the early 1930s, the 
company had established 3 fully integrated manufacturing systems – in England, 
Germany and France: these produced special products for national tastes, while being run 
by native managers who tried to minimise meddling from the company’s headquarters in 
Detroit, USA (Womack et al. 1990: 34–35). Compared to this early internationalisation, 
Multinational Corporations (MNCs) allow no, or are limiting, space for disintegrated 
management and production strategies of their geographically dispersed production 
facilities under globalisation. 
 
In dealing with the distinction and interrelationship between internationalisation and 
globalisation, Sturgeon and Florida (2000) suggest that interaction between the two leads 
to globalisation surpassing internationalisation. Within MNCs this is particularly so when 
they have presence within each global region – which could simultaneously represent a 
regional trading bloc. This is linked with the saturation of presence in each global region 
and the exploitation of market opportunities provided for by intra-regional trade regimes, 
as defined by common market policies. To some extent, the latter reflects the world that 
is characterised by regionalism and therefore in this context not yet fully globalised. 
 
The driving factors of internationalisation and globalisation include political action. This 
involves, for example, tariff structures, including import duties (Dicken 1998; Sturgeon 
& Florida 2000; Womack et al. 1990). In order to gain access to strategic markets, OEMs 
have been compelled, as discussed, to establish production facilities offshore. For 
instance in this way, according to Sturgeon and Florida (2000), restricted trade leads to 
globalisation in the sphere of production; those authors contrast this with globalisation in 
the sphere of markets, which, they argue, is driven by free trade, in other words, trade 
liberalisation. As such, their suggestion is that it seems that state policy can only be 
effective in choosing which aspect of globalisation will advance the fastest: markets or 
production. 
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In terms of production, in the automotive industry OEMs’ globalisation strategies have 
led to, among other things, the emergence of global suppliers (Sturgeon & Florida 2000; 
Veloso & Kumar 2002), and according to Veloso and Kumar (2002), to larger suppliers 
that are, however, smaller in number. Linked to this is the emergence of monopolisation 
in the supply value chain as in the final assembly operations. This is driven largely by 
consolidations, mergers, acquisitions and joint ventures. 
 
Another driver of monopolisation – especially in the supply chain – is identified by Ron 
Blum (2009) and Womack et al. (1990) in looking at lean production. Within their global 
production strategies, OEMs have been pushing to reduce the number of their own direct 
suppliers, which are mainly first tier suppliers. These suppliers, which have assumed 
increased responsibility – including coordination of their supply chains as a result of 
outsourcing by OEMs – have at the same time been tightening their rationalisation of 
production facilities, and have also, at the same time, been further reducing their own 
suppliers. Thus OEMs’ and suppliers’ contract awarding strategies and selection criteria 
contribute to monopolisation in the automotive industry value chain. 
 
In terms of globalised MNCs there has been standardisation (as driven by functional 
integration) of other measures such as cost cutting that contribute to internal 
rationalisation by both OEMs and suppliers. According to Blum (2009), in the two 
decades preceding the 2009 crisis within the global capitalist system, ‘the industry’s map 
and its workforce encountered unprecedented change as emergent countries fully 
incorporated into the global market system’ (2009: 19). In this, employers continually 
pushed cost cutting measures, not only through increased productivity of the workforce 
and more efficient methods for designing and building vehicles, but also through 
outsourcing, subcontracting and substituting of precarious for permanent work (Blum 
2009). Located in this context, for example, are changing forms of employment – to 
flexible, mainly insecure, forms of employment such as Short Term Contracts (STCs) and 
employment by labour brokers – which are also tied to increased market volatility. 
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Blum (2009) links MNCs’ global production strategies to what he calls a mix of 
fundamentalist policies, the financialisation of economic activity and rules of 
international trade and investment favoured by MNCs. Blum (2009) also charges that as 
part of this, MNCs’ global strategies ‘have tended to exert a general downward pressure 
on wages, conditions and social protections in many parts of the world’; and that, along 
with this, ‘income and wealth inequalities have reached extremes not seen since the 
1920s, moving the world in a direction opposite to authentic sustainable development’ 
(2009: 19).  
 
According to Sturgeon and Florida (2000), MNCs apply the low cost approach, 
particularly in terms of labour, even within the global regions, i.e. the trading blocs, 
where they invest. Strategies aimed at constantly lowering labour cost impact negatively 
on labour. In general terms (for instance, in terms of trade), the low cost approach finds 
among other things restricted trade as an impediment; restricted trade leads to higher cost 
in terms of, for example, prices of imported goods, which are viewed as being distorted 
by tariff structures including import duties. However, in the general relations of 
production and exchange, cost is also embedded in logistics, for example, transportation. 
According to Womack et al. (1990) transportation was a complex terrain in the past 
partly due to the nature of the heavy automotive vehicles required (Womack et al. 1990).  
 
Thus, among the drivers of globalisation are contradictory considerations that confront 
capitalists as they seek to resolve established impediments to accumulation. After all, 
globalisation is not merely a neutral spatial process. 
 
3.3. Neoliberal globalisation  
 
In the present work I adopt Dicken’s (1998) identification of functional integration of 
globally dispersed economic activities as globalisation’s central and defining feature, 
while acknowledging that the term is highly contested, and therefore understood in 
various ways (although more often as a matter of economic interest than scientific 
analysis). There are, however, other similar references to the term globalisation, which 
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also have a fairly wide acceptance. Richard Peet (2003) summarises these references 
thus: 
 Anthony Giddens (1990: 64): ‘the intensification of world-wide social relations 
which link distinct localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by 
events occurring many miles away’. 
 David Harvey (1989: 240): people ‘have to learn to cope with an overwhelming 
sense of compression of our spatial and temporal worlds’. 
 Roland Robertson (1992: 8): ‘the compression of the world and the intensification 
of consciousness of the world as a whole’. 
 
To understand globalisation as not merely a neutral spatial process, and to understand the 
dominant form that it has taken at least since the 1970s, it is important to look at its 
principal underlining ideology – neoliberalism. 
 
At the macro level, Peet (2003) defines neoliberalism as ‘an entire structure of beliefs 
founded on right-wing, but not conservative, ideas about individual freedom, political 
democracy, self-regulating markets and entrepreneurship’ (2003: 8); and as renewed 
nineteenth-century, especially British, ‘classical’ liberalism. In this context, Peet (2003) 
writes that ‘the classical liberal past is remembered in the neoliberal present not merely as 
received wisdom, but also through a series of creative re-enactments that respond to 
changed circumstances’ (2003: 8). One of the central policy obsessions in this regard is 
deregulation and privatisation of previously State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) (Peet 2003). 
Deregulation, along with liberalisation, has on a global scale been the driving force of 
globalisation in the sphere of the market (Sturgeon & Florida 2000).   
 
Unlike liberalism’s earlier reaction to mercantilism, neoliberalism emerged partly as a 
critical reaction to Keynesianism (Peet 2003) and also partly as a response to the 1970s 
crisis of the capitalist system (Bond 2009; Brenner 2009; Desai 2004), which was blamed 
by the right and the liberal school of thought on the interventionism that had followed 
both the 1929 and 1930s Great Depression and World War II. 
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Neoliberalism has thus attacked the role of the state in the economy. This has implied the 
introduction of policies such as slimlining of the state and, in addition to privatisation of 
SOEs, the outsourcing away from the state of functions considered the business of 
business, which is business. In addition, Peet (2003) suggests that neoliberal policies 
favour an outward-oriented export economy, organised through markets, trade 
liberalisation and limited budget deficits. Along with limiting budget deficits, neoliberal 
policy prescriptions, which have been globalised – or, more crudely speaking imposed, 
especially, on weaker countries without regard to national contexts – include cuts in 
social spending (Peet 2003). 
 
Institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), which are dominated by the USA and its allies as 
underpinned by the MNCs’ interests have, while having been established for different 
purposes, moved closer and coalesced in imposing neoliberal policy prescriptions (Peet 
2003). 
 
Therefore, what we have had as the dominant form of globalisation, at least since the 
1970s, is none other than neoliberal globalisation. This means that ‘rather than disparate 
peoples simply interacting as space collapses’ (Peet 2003: 2), the globe has instead 
experienced neoliberal functional integration – neoliberal globalisation. 
 
Unlike in the sphere of the market, where the IMF, World Bank, WTO and powerful 
capitalist states such as the USA have used their power to champion neoliberal 
globalisation and serve MNCs, as Peet (2003) argues that they do, in the sphere of 
production the MNCs have directly implemented their own programme, functionally 
integrating their globally dispersed operations. This has largely been driven by 
centralisation of decision-making on management and production strategies – or 
production systems as they are also called – at the headquarters of the respective MNCs 
(Barnes 2000, 2008; Barnes & Morris 2007; Black 2008; Peet 2003; Sturgeon & Florida 
2000; Veloso & Kumar 2002). Peet (2003) points out that this centralisation of power is 
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one of the instruments whereby MNCs that functionally integrate production strategies 
dominate competing labour forces. 
 
The automotive MNCs’ strategies have included: 
 Outsourcing of what is identified as non-core operations to suppliers – while an 
old phenomenon, this has been aggressive since at least the 1980s (Gereffi 2008; 
Sturgeon & Florida 2000; Womack et al. 1990).  
 A shift in employment as a result of outsourcing, from the final assembly 
operations to the supply chain operations (Gereffi 2008; Sturgeon & Florida 
2000).   
 As a result of outsourcing too, a reduction in the quality of jobs and a negative 
impact on unionisation (Sturgeon & Florida 2000). 
 Increasing competitive pressure in general, but more so towards geographically 
dispersed networks of plants, affiliates and suppliers (Barnes 2000; Bonacich & 
Wilson 2008; Sturgeon & Florida 2000; Veloso & Kumar 2002).        
 Aggressive cost reduction measures in general, but more so in the supply chain as 
part of contractual prerequisites and requirements by OEMs over suppliers, 
including increased quality requirements and enhanced Just In Time (JIT) 
systems (Barnes & Morris 2007; Veloso & Kumar 2002). 
 Global sourcing strategies (Sturgeon & Florida 2000). 
 
Related to globalisation as not just a neutral spatial process, Blum (2009) also points out 
that while automotive MNCs prioritise standardisation of their global production 
strategies, they have treated the upward harmonisation of terms and conditions of work, 
health and safety and industrial relations differentially. To this end, Blum (2009) 
identifies that there has been a growing divergence between productivity gains on the one 
hand, and improvements in wages and conditions for many workers across the 
automotive global value chain on the other; and that MNCs that have established 
industrial relations with unions in some countries nonetheless often fail to respect worker 
and trade union rights in others.   
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For example, regarding the global restructuring process in the white goods industry, 
Webster et al. (2008) find that it has actually contributed to the manufacture and 
reproduction of insecurity, which it uses to discipline the workforce. Nevertheless, they 
conclude that this process does provide fresh grounds for labour creatively to explore 
new forms of organising.  
 
Webster et al. (2008) argue that in restructuring production, capital itself creates points of 
vulnerabilities; and they identify three of these. First, there is the dependence of large 
institutional investors that depend on pension funds of workers; second, there is the high 
trade dependence of the global economy; and third, there is the dependence of 
corporations on successful marketing of products in global consumer markets. Taking up 
each of these points, Webster et al. (2008) argue that it is possible to pressurise 
corporations through an active worker presence in pension funds, disrupt the movement 
of goods and services to compel corporations to the bargaining table, and engage in 
consumer boycotts to make corporation lose their reputation. Webster et al. (2008) argue 
for the construction of global unionism that challenges the market logic corporation. This 
argument is linked to the new sources of power – including logistical power –  that 
Chapter 2 ends by highlighting for the purpose of the present study. 
 
3.4. The world’s strategic industry, and South Africa and Germany’s location 
 
The automotive industry is a strategic industry in a range of ways.  
 
According to the Organisation Internationale des Constructeurs d’Automobiles (OICA)3 
– International Organisation of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers – which was established in 
1919, were the automotive industry a country it would be the sixth largest economy in the 
world. OICA records that in 2005 the industry produced over 66 million cars, vans, 
trucks and buses and that these vehicles are essential to the workings of the global 
economy. According to OICA the 2005 output level, which was less than the industry’s 
2006, 2007 and 2008 output levels respectively, was equivalent to a global turnover 
                                                 
3
 See www.oica.net. 
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(gross revenue) of almost €2 trillion. The automotive industry is the world’s largest 
manufacturing sector, accounting for approximately 15 per cent of the global Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP); and its scale of operation makes it one of the largest 
employment sectors globally, accounting for one in nine jobs directly or indirectly in 
developed countries (OICA 2005, cited in Barnes 2008: 2) where the industry remains 
concentrated, notwithstanding the globalisation current (Sturgeon & Florida 2000). 
 
Table 3.1 shows the 2008 automotive industry’s global production of motor cars.  
 
Table 3.1: Global motor car production (2008) 
Global region  Volumes % 
Asia-Oceania 24 646 730 46.83  
Europe 18 373 538 34.91 
America 9 238 009 17.55 
Africa 378 929 0.72 
Total 52 637 206 100.00 
Source: OICA (www.oica.net, accessed December 2009)  
Note: Percentages are author’s own calculations. 
 
These figures exclude Light Commercial Vehicles (LCVs), heavy trucks and heavy 
buses. Were these to be included the figures would obviously rise. According to OICA 
the global automotive industry production of all vehicles was 70 526 531 in 2008; this 
represented a decline of 3.4 per cent4 from 73 266 061 in 2007. This decline has to be 
understood in the context of the global capitalist system crisis, which had begun imposing 
a downward spiral in production. Blum (2009) underlines the fact that the process of 
globalisation in the automotive industry has led to global overcapacity. The crisis 
worsened this situation. Global overcapacity is among the sources of the hyper 
competition taking place and its associated pressures in the automotive industry.  
 
The world’s leading economies have the largest automotive industry production output 
globally, and within their respective global regions. Of the motor car figures shown in 
Table 3.1, the USA accounts for 3 776 358, which is 20.55 per cent of the Americas’ 9 
                                                 
4
 Again, percentages are author’s own calculations. 
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238 009; Japan accounts for 9 944 637, which is 40.35 per cent of Asia-Oceania’s 24 646 
730; and Germany accounts for 5 526 882, which is 30.10 per cent of Europe’s 18 373 
538. Within the global regions, there is also a big gap between the largest producer in 
each case, and those lower down. For example, in Europe Germany is followed by 
France, but at 2 145 935. In terms of Africa, the continent’s leading developing economy 
is the single largest automotive industry production site. South Africa accounts for 321 
124 motor cars, which is 84.745 per cent of Africa’s total motor car production of 378 
929.5   
 
3.4.1. The South African automotive industry and NUMSA 
 
South Africa’s automotive industry is both nationally important (Barnes 2007) and 
important in Africa within the contexts of the African Union (AU) and the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC). South Africa contributes 40 per cent to 
Africa’s GDP, and has more cars than the rest of Africa combined (AIEC 2008: 8).  
 
The automotive industry is the leading manufacturing sector in the South African 
economy, contributing R1.995 billion (6.9%) in 2007 to the country’s GDP. According to 
South African Automotive Week: ‘There are more than 200 automotive component 
manufacturers in South Africa, and upwards of another 150 that supply the industry on a 
non-exclusive basis’ (SAAW 2009: 26).   
 
In terms of exports, the automotive industry in South Africa contributed 13.7 per cent in 
2007 (AIEC 2008: 13), and has an important direct employment contribution, according 
to OICA, of 112 300 jobs. Other activities from the analysis of the industry of industries 
included, the automotive industry contributes far more jobs to the South African 
economy than just assembly and component production operations. For example, the 
motor trade (retail), distribution and service have their own employment contribution, of 
195 000 (NAAMSA 2005: 15).  
                                                 
5
 All data are 2008 and the data source is OICA (www.oica.net, accessed December 2009), except 
percentage calculations, which are author’s own.  
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All of this makes South Africa’s automotive industry nationally important (Barnes & 
Morris 2007). However, according to Barnes and Morris (2007), global competitive 
pressures are substantial over the industry, whose survival under globalisation processes 
is credited largely to the Motor Industry Development Programme (MIDP) (see, for 
example, Barnes 2008; Barnes & Hartogh 2009; Black 2001).  
 
Barnes (2008) points out that the MIDP has largely managed to assist the automotive 
industry with global reintegration. He argues that this has occurred with positive 
adjustments in realigning the position of the South African automotive industry within a 
global, rather than national, framework. This, writes Barnes (2008), is evidenced in large-
scale export programmes with a substantial growth of components exports.  
 
The South African automotive industry emerged in the early 1920s, with FMC and GM 
being the first to establish production presence in the country (Black 2001). This industry 
developed under a series of Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) programmes, with 
high levels of protection, at the centre of which was the objective of increasing local 
content (Black 2001). 
 
It is a widely shared perspective that without the MIDP (now the Automotive Production 
Development Programme or APDP, as reflected in Chapter 1), the South African 
automotive industry would not have survived globalisation processes (see, for example, 
Barnes & Morris 2007; Black 2001, 2008). There is, however, an exception to this 
viewpoint. 
 
For example, Frank Flatters (2005) is of the view that the MIDP, and therefore by 
extension the APDP, represents waste, and therefore, that policy focus must be redirected 
to the motor retail sector, where most jobs are located, rather than in the capital-intensive 
production processes as characterised by assembly plants’ operations. Flatters’s (2005) 
train of thought is, however, not aligned to the strategic importance of manufacturing, in 
particular viewed in the entirety of the automotive industry as the industry of industries. 
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The motor retail sector in South Africa cannot be understood comprehensively in 
isolation from components production and final assembly operations, either historically 
or under global integration following the country’s transition to a democratic 
dispensation. 
  
The MIDP’s success in maintaining the survival of South Africa’s automotive industry 
notwithstanding, Barnes & Morris (2007) argue that this industry is, nevertheless, 
globally insignificant. They draw this conclusion partly from the industry’s low volume 
production as a percentage of total global production. South Africa’s 321 124 motor cars 
produced made up only 0.61 per cent of the total 52 637 206 global motor car production 
in 2008. The executive director of the National Association of Automotive Component & 
Allied Manufacturers (NAACAM), Roger Pitot (in an interview in November 2009), 
pointed out that the lack of economies of scale within South Africa’s automotive industry 
is a critical challenge to the components sector, the supply value chain. 
 
According to Pitot (interview), this contributes negatively to the cost structure of local 
production and serves as one of the barriers to localisation (local production – otherwise 
referred to as local content) and investment. Embedded in this, points out Pitot, are 
limitations to South Africa’s automotive supply value chain. In this the scope for raising 
productivity gets limited. For example, considering low production volumes, other 
employers do not use investment as a productivity measure because of the cost factor. 
Pitot pointed out that the best way to raise productivity is to increase volumes. This will 
allow increased investments. According to Pitot, however, huge investments to raise 
productivity under condition of low volume production are costly.  
 
The capitalist mode of production is such that the capitalist puts less into commodity 
production, where workers add value from which the capitalist pulls out more; the ‘more’ 
being the surplus added by workers – i.e. surplus-value (Marx 1990/1887). 
 
Implied in lack of investment is pressure on labour, as other employers treat it as the 
main adjustable lever – a variable cost (variable capital). In this, unions are not left 
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untouched. Along with their members, they too are affected and at times in a manner that 
renders them embroiled in addressing internal problems. For example, organisational 
instability erupted in 2009 at VW South Africa’s Uitenhage-based assembly plant for 
reasons that include the handling of changes in work and production organisation. As a 
result, NUMSA removed all shop stewards, thereby dissolving the Shop Steward 
Committee (SSC), and conducted fresh elections. Whether such a solution would be 
sustainable in the context of constant restructuring would require further time and another 
study.  
 
On other challenges that face the South African automotive industry value chain, Pitot 
(interview) pointed to what he called lack of proper monetary and industrial policies. As 
part of the resolutions from its job security conferences held in 2009 (in response to the 
global capitalist system crisis that was under way), NUMSA has since intensified and 
championed a campaign against the Reserve Bank of South Africa’s use of high interest 
rates to advance a policy of inflation targeting. Pitot agrees with NUMSA that the 
Reserve Bank’s predominant focus on the policy of inflation targeting and to this end the 
use of high interest rates counts negatively against suppliers.  
 
High interest rates burden suppliers, particularly small, medium and micro enterprises, in 
terms of credit by either limiting access to credit or making existing credit unsustainable. 
This, Pitot (interview) argued, is a barrier to investment. He also suggested that South 
Africa’s high inflation rate is a structural problem, whose sustainable solution cannot lie 
in cosmetic measures and is rather to be found in proper monetary, fiscal, industrial and 
economic development and growth policies. 
 
Further, Pitot did not fail to mention the volatile exchange rate and progressively 
increasing cost of energy, particularly electricity, as challenges to the industry. At the 
time of the interview the exchange rate was up and acting against exports, while Eskom, 
the state-owned electricity utility, was pushing for increases in end-user rates.    
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All of the challenges to which Pitot pointed are significant macro policy issues that would 
merit close attention in another study. They are, however, important to highlight in terms 
of the challenges leading to short-term and long-term restructuring in industries such as 
the automotive industry. 
 
NUMSA as the largest trade union in the South African automotive industry 
NUMSA is the largest trade union in the South African automotive industry. This is an 
industrial union structurally located and organising in the metal and related industries in 
general. According to the report, The State of COSATU Affiliates, prepared by the 
National Labour and Economic Development Institute (NALEDI) for the Congress of 
South African Trade Unions’ (COSATU) 10th National Congress held in 2009, NUMSA 
organised 216 808 members in total in 2008. According to this NALEDI report, 
NUMSA’s membership consists of 60 per cent males, 40 per cent females, and 75 per 
cent young people under the age of 30. 
 
NUMSA is considered to be one of COSATU’s militant affiliates and its militancy’s 
influence is felt even in the formulation of government policy, for example, the 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) (see Forrest 2005).  
 
Barely two years into South Africa’s transition to a democratic dispensation NUMSA got 
confronted with a difficult situation arising out of the country’s reintegration into the 
global economy. This was partly the function of the legacy of apartheid that led to years 
of isolation, which included sanctions. In its 5th National Congress (September 1996) and 
National Policy Conferences (1997) in response to the challenges of the corresponding 
competitive pressures and effects of the associated management techniques on workers, 
NUMSA (NUMSA 1997: 29) resolved the following: 
 
a. That workers need to be productive, but that as a union NUMSA rejected the 
ideology and proposals for competitiveness. 
b. To oppose any attempt to make workers compete against their counterparts 
elsewhere. 
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c. To reject the new management and production techniques on the basis that they 
would not lead to genuine worker participation and democratisation of the 
workplace. 
d. That instead of focusing on making different companies competitive, the union 
should devise industrial policies that would lead to the development of productive 
capacities and job creation. 
e. That – partially in recognition of managements’ unilateral implementation of 
restructuring, encompassing changes in work and production organisation as each 
company strives for competitiveness, and in line with the ideal of worker control 
– the union should put forward a programme for workplace democratisation, and 
demand that the following issues be negotiated:   
 strategic business plans; 
 introduction of new technology, use of machines and line speed; 
 plant utilisation and layout; 
 benchmarks, targets and production schedules; 
 product development plans; 
 work organisation and work processes; 
 a quality assurance programme; 
 working time and patterns; 
 company and organisational structures; 
 investments in human and capital resources; 
 human resource planning (which includes workforce levels), training and 
skills; 
 affirmative action programmes; 
 productivity and performance assessment; 
 remuneration, bonuses, incentive schemes, grading and wage structure; and 
 wealth sharing schemes and a dividends policy.  
 
This underlines the extent to which the union was determined to play its role in the 
workplace and in extending collective bargaining rights.  
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3.4.2. The German automotive industry and IG Metall 
 
As already highlighted, the German automotive industry is the largest in Europe. 
According to OICA, it accounted in 2008 for the production of 5 526 882 vehicles, which 
is 30.1 per cent of Europe’s total motor car production: 18 373 538. The automotive 
industry accounts for over a fifth of Germany’s total industrial investment, and has over 
the last 10 years invested over €100 billion in Germany as a location for industry (VDA 
2009: 268). According to the Verband der Automobilindustrie,6 in 2008 the German 
automotive industry achieved a turnover of €287 billion, which is over a fifth of the 
country’s corresponding total industrial turnover (VDA 2009: 267–268).  
 
Also known as the ‘motor’ of German industry (VDA 2009) because of its strategic 
importance to the country’s economy, the German automotive industry’s 5 526 882 car 
production volume in 2008 constituted 10.5 per cent of the corresponding global 
production: 52 637 206.7 
 
The automotive industry in Germany accounts for 17 per cent of the country’s exports 
(Straubhaar 2007: 98). According to the VDA (2009: 54), three out of four cars produced 
in Germany are exported, and the country has an automotive trade surplus of €100 billion 
(VDA 2009: 268). Unlike that of South Africa, Germany’s automotive industry is thus an 
important global player. Located in ‘the world’s third largest national economy after 
USA and Japan’, the German automotive industry is in the global top four automotive 
producing countries, along with Japan, China – which is increasingly gaining economic 
significance and has overtaken the USA in automotive production – and the USA itself  
(VDA 2009: 269). 
 
The strategic nature of Germany’s automotive industry is underpinned not only by its 
host of other countries’ OEM MNCs, but also by the fact that it has its own, including  
the old OEM MNCs, namely Audi, BMW, Daimler (Mercedes Benz), Opel (which was 
                                                 
6
 Association of German Automotive Manufacturers  
7
 The source of the figure is OICA; the percentage calculation is the author’s. 
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acquired by the USA’s GM), Porsche and VW. As stated in Chapter 1, three of these 
(BMW, Mercedes Benz and VW), are part of the seven MNCs that have production 
facilities in South Africa. This gives Germany not only enormous presence, but also a 
leading role in terms of foreign investments, in the South African automotive industry. 
Further, according to the Automotive Industry Export Council (AIEC 2008), VW, a 
German MNC, captured South Africa’s largest proportion of market share in 2007. 
 
Germany is South Africa’s leading automotive trading partner, at R39.47 billion worth of 
trade in 2007; South African imports of light automotive vehicles from Germany totalled 
26 per cent, and Original Equipment Components (OECs), 30 per cent, of the respective 
imports in 2007 (AIEC 2008). According to the AIEC (2008), trade rankings between 
South Africa and its trading partners in the automotive industry reflected the global 
linkages of OEM parent companies. For instance, Germany has three OEMs in South 
Africa, the highest to any country, and it is South Africa’s leading automotive trading 
partner. This phenomenon falls within the view that intra-MNCs’ trade contributes 
significantly to world trade. As already stated, compared with other countries, Germany 
has a greater proportion of OEM production facilities in South Africa. Again, South 
African imports from German far outweigh the country’s exports to Germany, with thus a 
deficit for South Africa. 
 
The German automotive industry accounts for every seventh employee in that country’s 
economy (Straubhaar 2007: 98). It is thus the most important employer in the country 
(VDA 2009: 266). According to OICA8 the automotive industry employs 773 217 
workers in Germany. As is the case in South Africa, were other employment spin-offs 
due to the extended nature of the automotive industry to be taken into consideration, the 
figure would be far higher.  
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 Information from OICA is obtained from its website: www.oica.net, accessed December 2009  
  
  60 
IG Metall: ‘the world of over 2.3 million citizens’ 
In terms of trade union organisation, IG Metall is the largest trade union in the German 
automotive industry. However, compared to NUMSA, its scope is much broader. It 
organises in the metal industry; extractive metallurgy; iron and steel industry; metal 
trades industry and other services in the metal sector; and textile and garment related 
industries and services; as well as in wood and plastics processing.9  
 
IG Metall calls itself ‘the world of over 2.3 million citizens’. The union organises 2 300 
105 members, of whom 82 per cent are male, 18 per cent female, and 9 per cent under 27 
years of age. The union’s membership also consists of the unemployed, mainly those on 
pension, who form 10 per cent. In South Africa, NUMSA is mainly blue collar in terms 
of membership, and is still searching for ways to organise white collar workers. In 
Germany, IG Metall is relatively successful in organising white collar workers, who 
make up 18 per cent of the union’s membership. IG Metall has more than 125 000 shop 
stewards and Works Councils in more than 18 000 companies.   
 
IG Metall is the largest affiliate of the German Confederation of Trade Unions: 
Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB). The union accounts for 36 per cent of DGB’s 
affiliates’ membership. Like NUMSA in South Africa, IG Metall has played an important 
role in Germany’s industrial history. For example, IG Metall played a central role in the 
struggle that culminated in a 35-hour working week in Germany, through strikes, court 
actions and other labour movement tactics (Schneider 1991). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9
 The information in this section on IG Metall is drawn from the union’s website (www.igm.de), accessed 
December 2009. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE LOGISTICAL REVOLUTION, NUMSA AND IG METALL IN A 
GLOBALISED PRODUCTION REGIME 
 
This chapter turns to the ‘hidden abode of production’10 – our modern day globalised 
workplace – and the logistics revolution, to look into work and production changes as 
they have affected NUMSA and IG Metall. This is done largely through a reflection on 
the data gathered during field work (as explained in Chapter 1). 
 
4.1. BMW South Africa, Rosslyn 
 
4.1.1. Outsourcing, crisis and retrenchments, employment and the role of Munich 
in Rosslyn   
 
Outsourcing of the warehouse, Midrand  
BMW has a production plant in Rosslyn, and until 2009 the company also had a 
warehouse in Midrand. The warehouse has since been transferred as a going concern 
under Section 197 of the Labour Relations Act (LRA, No. 66 of 1995) to Kuehne + 
Nagel, a German Multinational Corporation (MNC) specialising in supply chain logistics. 
Kuehne + Nagel employs over 55 000 workers at 900 locations in more than 100 
countries.11 According to the BMW plant director in Rosslyn, Knudt Flor (in an interview 
in December 2009), because of its expertise Kuehne + Nagel has a contract with BMW 
globally. 
 
The outsourcing of the warehouse in Midrand followed a decision by BMW’s global 
headquarters in Munich (Germany), which required all warehouses to be outsourced as 
part of a global production and management strategy in respect of core and non-core 
functions as well as associated expertise (Flor interview).   
 
                                                 
10
 As discussed in Chapter 2, according to Marx (1990/1867), a capitalist workplace is a ‘hidden abode of 
production’, where capital is not only producing, but is itself produced. 
11
 The statistics are from www.kn-portal.com, accessed December 2009.  
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Before it was outsourced, the company’s Midrand-based warehouse was – jointly with 
the assembly plant in Rosslyn – part of the National Bargaining Forum (NBF). The NBF 
is a collective bargaining forum between NUMSA and all of the seven Original 
Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) in South Africa. The implication of the outsourcing is 
that Midrand is now a standalone Parts and Accessories (P&A) entity. Therefore the 
workforce it employs will no longer be covered under the NBF, but will have to fall 
under the Motor Industry Bargaining Council (MIBC). 
 
The case of BMW’s warehouse shows that, from being vehemently opposed to 
outsourcing, the union’s position has in practice became flexible depending on 
surrounding circumstances. These include the balance of power, and whether or not jobs 
stand to be placed on the line or employment benefits and terms and conditions to be 
varied downwards. Given that the particular example of the Midrand warehouse took 
place relatively recently (2009), and that management in such cases can provide 
guarantees that lead to agreement, it will be interesting to see long-term how the union 
will continue to engage in this area.  
 
A NUMSA shop steward at BMW (in an interview in December 2009) recalled that the 
outsourcing of car seat production from the assembly plant in Rosslyn in the mid-1990s 
had almost completely concluded the process of outsourcing of production operations. He 
said that the outsourcing of Midrand – although a warehouse – served as confirmation to 
him that as long as production is for profit the process of restructuring by companies can 
never be guaranteed to be complete. 
 
Economic and business downturns: retrenchments at BMW South Africa 
The present study was conducted during a crisis of the global capitalist economic system. 
The automotive industry in South Africa has for the most part responded to this crisis 
with retrenchments, temporary lay-offs and short-time. In terms of the practice of crisis 
retrenchments, workers are retrenched during downturns and hired during upturns. This 
makes employment in the automotive industry cyclical. 
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According to Flor (interview), retrenchment is not part of BMW’s philosophy. This is 
partly why there were no retrenchments in the BMW’s Rosslyn assembly plant during 
this crisis. Further, retrenchments are normally preceded by the termination of Temporary 
Short Term Contracts (STCs) where they exist. Unions such as NUMSA consider this to 
be part of job loss, which it is.  
 
Flor (interview) argues that retrenchments lead to companies losing skills and that this is 
a problem because skilled workers are likely to find jobs elsewhere, and then are hard to 
rehire during upturns, when production pressures build up from a rise in demand. That is 
why, according to Flor, BMW has systems in place to avoid retrenchments.  
 
BMW has a system of standing voluntary separation, which, along with termination of 
STCs, resignations, natural attrition, and dismissals for misconduct, plays a role in 
workforce reduction (NUMSA shop stewards from BMW interview: 2 November 2009). 
Most of the time there are no replacements. But if there are, the trend is that of STCs.      
 
Further, as reflected in Masondo (2003), BMW has a system of overtime banking, called 
Working Time Account (WTA). This is a voluntary overtime savings scheme. The WTA 
now provides for more options (Flor interview). Workers can now choose whether to 
save the overtime premium or the wage base rate of any overtime worked in any day. In 
terms of this system, when production output is down – as during transitions to new 
models, and economic and business downturns – BMW places workers on temporary lay-
off with WTA savings paid out in the form of ordinary wages. If the savings are not 
sufficient to cover for ordinary wages, the company still pays ordinary wages in full to 
respective WTA volunteers, but in the form of an advance. This advance is recovered 
from future WTA savings or workers’ separation funds if they resign or for any reason 
(including death) have their employment terminated while on the negative balance. A 
simple mathematical or political economic analysis is that ultimately the company does 
not incur any cost from WTA as practised in its Rosslyn’s assembly plant; on the 
contrary, it appears that BMW stands only to reap benefits.   
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When looked at in isolation the WTA facilitates the ‘no work, no pay’ principle because 
it is ultimately the workers themselves who pay, from their own savings. These savings 
can still be made independently of the WTA, directly or through the union should it make 
this consideration in view of its principle of worker control. Also, as already stated, the 
advance made by the company under WTA is recovered. This is unlike in Germany 
(Regensburg assembly and Wackersdorf components plants), where the advance is not 
recovered when workers resign or have their employment terminated for any reason 
(including death). 
 
It also appears that WTA plays a role in facilitating flexibility in respect of the use of 
overtime work to respond to a rise in demand. Rise in demand often leads to an increase 
in production volumes. The manner in which this flexibility could be realised has an 
effect of deepening real subordination of labour to capital. 
 
For instance, in BMW’s Rosslyn assembly plant, when workers know that they have to 
make savings under WTA in order to prepare for a future temporary lay-off or pay back a 
WTA advance (debt) made by the company, they are less likely to resist working 
overtime. In the South African automotive industry, overtime work sometimes involves 
disputes, as workers refuse it. From my own seven years’ experience training and 
working in an automotive assembly plant, the reasons for this are best summarised by 
Marx (1990/1867) when dealing with the working day in Chapter 10 of Capital (Vol. I), 
as also reflected in Chapter 2 of the present report. To recap, according to Marx 
(1990/1867) the prolongation of the working day limits the time available to workers to 
satisfy their needs as social beings, which include rest time, involvement and social 
interaction in communities and households, and intellectual development.  
 
To locate but three examples from workers’ material life: first, there are workers who are 
also studying. Especially when working, studying requires extra effort and much more 
effective and efficient use of time. Second, many workers are involved in their 
communities. In looking at Defy in Ezakheni (Ladysmith) in the province of KwaZulu-
Natal, Webster et al. (2008) found that workers not only attend funerals at weekends, but 
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are in this regard also directly involved in providing assistance in their communities 
through burial societies and other forms of help schemes. Finally, in South Africa there 
are various community participatory structures, which require workers’ involvement in 
various capacities including as parents. These structures include school governing bodies, 
local government ward committees and community policing forums.  
 
NUMSA’s political strategy is to combine workplace and community struggles (Forrest 
2005; Von Holdt 2003). As such the union expects its members to be involved in 
community structures and struggles. The union also encourages its members to join and 
be active in South Africa’s ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC), and in the 
South African Communist Party (SACP).12 These two formations are together in an 
alliance with the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), to which 
NUMSA is affiliated. 
 
In BMW’s Rosslyn assembly plant, the WTA was resisted when management first 
wanted to introduce it. Workers gave their NUMSA shop stewards a mandate to reject it, 
and this was done. The WTA was then left to a voluntary process during which the 
outcome was the opposite; when management approached workers individually to opt for 
the WTA on a voluntary basis, one after another (up to approximately 70 per cent), did 
so. The voluntary nature of the WTA in Rosslyn still, however, presents impediments to 
the company. Flor (interview) points to management complexities in administering the 
different voluntary options available under the WTA. Then too, the WTA in Rosslyn’s 
assembly plant has not been joined by all workers. Flor stated that the company prefers 
how the WTA is managed in Germany, where standard negotiated agreements would 
cover all workers.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 For example, this is stated in NUMSA’s 7th and 8th National Congress Resolutions (NUMSA 2008). 
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Employment, workforce profile and the role of Munich in employment decisions in 
Rosslyn 
BMW South Africa’s employment contribution typically encompasses assembly plant 
operations, the supply network, sales and distribution (e.g. dealerships and 
transportation), maintenance and repair services. Taking this into consideration, Flor 
(interview) suggests that if the company were to shut down completely, over 15 000 jobs 
would be lost. This is significant in the light of the country’s high unemployment rate, at 
24.5 per cent in terms of the official (narrow) definition according to Statistics South 
Africa’s 2009 third quarter Labour Force Survey (LFS) (Stats SA 2009b).13  
 
In terms of direct employment, according to BMW South Africa’s Employment Equity 
(EE) report (BMW South Africa 2009), in this period14 the company employed a total of 
2 394 workers. According to Flor (interview), the warehouse in Midrand employed 
approximately 450 workers. The company’s total workforce of 2 394 included 686 white 
collar workers: mainly legislators (top management), senior officials, professionals, 
technicians and associate professionals. These categories are mainly white people, at 405, 
with 306 of these being male and 99 female. Within the categories of legislators, senior 
officials, managers and professionals, there are 19 foreign nationals, all of whom are 
male. The appointment of foreign nationals in top and senior management positions is 
common to all automotive MNCs in South Africa. Those holding key positions are 
mainly rotational, come from the respective headquarter countries and have to do with the 
implementation of global production and management strategies. One can term them 
‘global workers’.    
    
BMW South Africa’s workforce is also made up of clerks (342): mainly African males 
(221), followed by African females (44). A larger proportion of the company’s workforce 
(1 131) is constituted by blue collar workers, defined in the EE report (BMW South 
Africa 2009) as plant and machine operators and assemblers. According to that report, 
they are mainly black Africans, with 983 of these being male and 135 female, and with 5 
                                                 
13
 The expanded definition of unemployment obviously provides a higher unemployment figure than the 
official or narrow definition. 
14
 1 June 2007–31 May 2008 
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coloured and 8 Indian people. This is the bedrock of the membership of NUMSA, the 
largest trade union at BMW South Africa. NUMSA has 863 members in the Rosslyn 
assembly plant. It has 9 shop stewards; the 10th one had passed away and at the time of 
this study there was no replacement effected (NUMSA shop steward interview: 9 
December 2009). 
 
Coupled with unions’ political policy15 the white top and black bottom disparity in 
employment hierarchy has influence over the profile of the union membership. As stated 
in Chapter 3, NUMSA is largely entrenched in the blue collar workforce. In South Africa, 
the blue collar workforce is for the most part black people (‘black’ as defined in the 
Employment Equity Act – EEA –  No. 55 of 1998, as Africans, coloureds and Indians). In 
this, Africans make up a larger proportion. Thus, the white top and black bottom disparity 
in employment hierarchy is not unique to BMW South Africa; rather, it is a general 
reality that is still prevalent in South Africa, particularly in the private sector. 
 
The Commission for Employment Equity (CEE) annual report (2009) argues that ‘the 
current progress rate will take employers approximately one hundred years to achieve 
equitable representation in workplaces’ (2009: 2). This is unlike in the public sector 
where transformation has been faster. ‘Government’s progress in terms of equitable 
representation is masking the little achievement made by all employers’, remarks the 
CEE (2009: 2). 
 
The white top and black bottom disparity in employment hierarchy reflects the legacy of 
the country’s colonial and apartheid past. Karl von Holdt (2003) calls the corresponding 
workplace relations the ‘apartheid workplace regime’. 
 
Through its EE plan and report (BMW South Africa 2009), the company seeks to redress 
the racial and gender imbalances of the past and provide for equal opportunities, 
                                                 
15
 For instance, there are workers (particularly at the top of the employment hierarchy) who would not join 
unions such as NUMSA because of their political policy as characterised by COSATU’s alliance with the 
ANC and SACP. There is another history to this. Colonisation and apartheid, under which racism meant 
incentives to and partial co-option of some sections of the white working class in some instances, could still 
have part of their legacies in place. 
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including accommodation for people with disabilities, as is required in the rest of the 
country’s economy under the EEA.  
 
According to its EE report, BMW South Africa also employs 186 non-permanent 
employees. Africans make up the large proportion of these, mainly males, at 170. The 
non-permanent employees are under STCs, an Absentee Pool (AP) (union–management 
meeting: 9 December 2009) and Contract Labour Brokers (CLBs) (Flor interview). CLB 
is the category of STCs employed under labour brokers. However, the NUMSA Shop 
Steward Committee (SSC) seemed unaware of the use of labour brokers by the company.  
 
But what is the AP? In what way does it differ from ordinary STCs? And where does it 
stand in relation to labour broking?  
 
Unlike ordinary STCs, which are renewed on average for between three and six months 
or even a year, the AP consists of even more flexible workers; workers under the AP 
report to the company every day but are only deployed to production after assessment of 
whether or not there are absenteeisms. According to NUMSA shop stewards at BMW 
South Africa (focus group: 9 December 2009), those not deployed are ultimately paid 
about R60.00 for the particular day of being turned away without work. 
 
Although appearing to be a labour broking practice, the AP as it is presently being 
practised at BMW South Africa’s assembly plant in Rosslyn is reportedly administered 
by the company. In this regard there is no intermediary – the middleman, i.e. the labour 
broker – involved. Nevertheless, this practice, like labour broking and STCs to some 
extent, has the effect of deepening real subordination of labour to capital. This is reflected 
partly in the extreme vacillation of affected workers between employment and 
unemployment. This renders the affected workers a highly flexible appendage to 
production. With or without them, production goes on. 
 
On 9 December 2009 NUMSA shop stewards advanced, in a meeting with the company’s 
hourly human resource management representatives, a demand for all STCs to be made 
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permanent. In rejecting the NUMSA shop stewards’ demands on AP STCs, human 
resource management stated that the AP was not created out of the company’s will but 
due to excessive absenteeism. In the meeting the causes of absenteeism were not probed. 
 
However, the way in which work is organised and performed can, among other health 
and safety hazards, lead to overwork, and therefore to worker fatigue and associated 
absenteeism. The company, according to shop stewards (focus group: 9 December 2009), 
for instance requires a workload factor of 100 per cent as part of its production system, 
Value-added Production System (VPS). A number of implications flow from this. For 
example, at its most extreme, work must be performed continuously; in crude terms, non-
stop, and at maximum speed, and there must be no interference of any sort unless it is a 
formal break when workers can rest. 
 
With regard to ordinary STCs, the representatives of hourly human resource management 
conceded that without these STCs the plant does not have full capacity to run production. 
Therefore, in line with this recognition, a six-month extension of the STCs was made 
(hourly human resource management, union–management meeting: 9 December 2009). 
However, management stated that the company’s employment practice of STCs and the 
rest of the company’s employment decisions are based on market conditions. This means 
that employment must be as flexible as, and respond to, market fluctuations. Not 
surprisingly, the union found this problematic; NUMSA shop stewards (union–
management meeting: 9 December 2009) claimed that there are workers who have been 
employed under STCs for over four or five years. 
 
From another angle, which can be defined as a globalisation angle – especially in terms 
of intra-MNCs’ functional integration – management (union–management meeting: 9 
December 2009) stated that converting the STCs into permanent contracts, as NUMSA 
demanded, does not fall under Rosslyn’s competency, but is rather a decision for Munich 
to make. Thus, until such time as Munich approves a request made from Rosslyn to 
convert a certain number of ordinary STCs into permanent contracts, this would not be 
done (hourly human resource management, union–management meeting: 9 December 
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2009). Emphasis on ‘a certain number’ arises from the company’s insistence on (or rather 
rigidity regarding) employment flexibility in terms of market conditions. 
 
Both Rosslyn’s referral of a decision on STCs to Munich, and the outsourcing of the 
warehouse under a global directive from Munich, reflect a globalisation trend where key 
financial decisions of MNCs’ global production and management strategies are 
centralised at respective headquarters. Although the STC workers at BMW are, according 
to NUMSA shop stewards (focus group: 9 December 2009) receiving benefits such as the 
company’s medical aid and provident fund contributions,16 employing them on a 
permanent basis is still a financial decision. For instance, when the company terminates 
the STCs the affected workers do not receive a severance (separation) pay (package), 
which permanent workers receive. This is a cost saving on the part of the company. 
 
A challenge for NUMSA as a union in a country that does not have its own MNCs in 
specific areas of production – for example, OEMs in the automotive industry – is how to 
organise differently under conditions of the form of globalisation that is characterised by 
functional integration in which decision-making is centralised at headquarters (home 
countries) of these MNCs. 
 
4.1.2. Rosslyn, production capacity and the competitive struggles  
 
Rosslyn runs a 2-shift pattern of a 9-hour day. Each shift produces approximately 125 
units: 3-series BMW in its different variants, totalling thus approximately 250 units per 
day and including both Left Hand Drive (LHD) and Right Hand Drive (RHD) vehicles 
(Flor interview). According to Flor, about 83 per cent of Rosslyn’s production is for 
export to the USA as the main export destination, then Japan, Australia, South Korea and, 
from 2009, also Canada. According to Flor, this makes economic crisis bad for BMW 
South Africa if it occurs outside South Africa, at export destinations. 
 
                                                 
16
 For STCs at BMW to be receiving such other benefits as the company’s contributions to medical aid 
scheme and provident fund is progress because in other instances and companies STCs are denied such. 
See, for example, Webster et al. (2008).  
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The 3-series BMW model is not assembled only in Rosslyn. It is also assembled in 
Germany: Regensburg, which has 1 100 units per day capacity; Munich, which has 900 
units per day capacity; and Leipzig, which has 600 units per day capacity (120 of which 
are BMW 3-series) (Flor interview). Thus Rosslyn included, the company has four 
production facilities for 3-series BMW. Of them all, Rosslyn has the least production 
capacity; it is a comparatively low volume production facility. 
 
On the whole, this situation means intense competition within BMW as an MNC. Flor 
(interview) states that, in order to survive, Rosslyn has to fight for higher volumes 
because low volume production counts negatively in terms of economies of scale. As to 
what makes Rosslyn still an option for BMW, Flor pointed to a number of competitive 
advantages that apply to South Africa: first, the country has a low labour cost compared 
to Germany; second, the Motor Industry Development Programme or MIDP (now the 
Automotive Production and Development Programme or APDP) offers attractive 
production incentives; and third, BMW believes that Africa constitutes a future market to 
be taken seriously. Investment follows growth, argues Flor. In this, therefore, BMW’s 
investment in South Africa is strategically located. 
 
According to the Automotive Industry Export Council (AIEC 2008: 8), South Africa 
contributes 25 per cent to Africa’s GDP, and holds 40 per cent of the continent’s total 
industrial output, 45 per cent of its mineral output, 50 per cent of its buying power, and 
more industrial facilities than the rest of the continent combined. The AIEC (2008) points 
out that South Africa is also a gateway into Africa in supplying transport, 
communications, investment and even energy; and has one of the best infrastructure and 
service industries among developing nations. This thus constitutes a further competitive 
advantage that applies to South Africa. 
 
Finally, South Africa is among the sub-Saharan African countries that are covered under 
the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). AGOA17 (and its subsequent 
                                                 
17
 AGOA was signed into law on 18 May 2000 as Title 1 of the USA’s Trade and Development Act of 
2000. 
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evolutions) provides for trade incentives to sub-Saharan African countries. This 
comprises trade preferences and duty-free imports into the USA – automotive products 
included. 
 
Of the above four factors that BMW considers competitive advantages, to both low wage 
cost and AGOA there is another side, for which they are often criticised. Against low 
wage cost, also called cheap labour, there is an outright struggle by workers and their 
unions. And AGOA, which is a subject for further study, is also contested in a number of 
areas. This includes its expansionism of free market globalisation, as embedded in its 
trade-offs; and its results: that is to say, whether or not it has actually led to the envisaged 
success in particular sub-Saharan African countries. 
 
However, unlike some of the other sub-Saharan African countries that could be 
constrained by limited capacity, South Africa’s capacity to seize potential opportunities 
provided for under AGOA – notwithstanding its negatives – explains why the USA is 
BMW South Africa’s main export destination. 
 
However, BMW South Africa experiences disadvantages as well. Flor (interview) cited 
both inbound and outbound logistical cost coupled with underdeveloped supplier capacity 
as the main disadvantages. This is in addition to the low volume production – lack of 
economies of scale – already mentioned. According to Flor, the internal rail transport 
system has not reached a sufficiently advanced level to complement road transport, which 
has its own complexities. Also, lack of economies of scale compels exports from BMW’s 
Rosslyn assembly plant to its main export destination, USA, to be transported to Europe 
first; from there, together with other exports, they go on to their final destination. An 
average vessel caries about 4 000 vehicles and larger vessels up to 7 000 vehicles; 
however, there is no such capacity constantly available to convince logistics companies 
to take a straight line to the USA (Flor interview). The solution, according to Flor, is to 
improve on economies of scale and to build a strong supplier base that is globally 
competent. 
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As stated in Chapter 2 (citing Womack et al. 1990), a Complete Built Up (CBU) vehicle 
is made up of over 10 000 discrete parts assembled in major components or modules – 
engines, transmissions, steering gears, axles, suspensions, cockpits, doors, exhaust 
systems, climate control systems, and dashboards, which also encompass entertainment 
(e.g. radio) and recent technologies such as navigators etc. In responding to the global 
capitalist crisis in 2009 from which its members faced large-scale retrenchments, 
NUMSA convened a national job security conference followed by similar conferences in 
its regions. From this the union was to strongly renew its commitment to its standing 
campaign for local content production. When achieved this would, for instance in the 
automotive industry lead to the many parts and components or modules that go into CBU 
vehicles being manufactured locally. 
 
Focusing on reducing both inbound and outbound logistical costs, Flor (interview) 
concurs with NUMSA and further identifies minimum areas for action on a long-term 
sustainability basis. Flor argues that improving economies of scale through local content 
production – in other words, building a complete automotive value chain locally – would 
among other things require a coherent and well coordinated strategy to develop capacity 
in process (which includes instruments of labour) and product development. According to 
Flor, the supply chain must be prioritised in all of this. In terms of education and training, 
this means that skills development must also have a strong focus on postgraduate levels, 
where Research and Development (R&D) are central competencies and expected 
outcomes. 
 
Further, like many others, Flor points to South Africa’s mineral resources18 as an 
advantage that it is not sustainable to continue losing; these resources are extracted and 
                                                 
18
 The AIEC (2008) provides the best summary of South Africa’s mineral resources base although not on 
all minerals, as follows: ‘South Africa possesses an abundance of raw materials and is the world’s top 
ranked producer of platinum, palladium, rhodium, chrome, manganese, vanadium, vermiculite, ferro-
chromium and alumino-silicates. In terms of global reserves and production of minerals, the country holds 
90% of platinum-group metals, 80% of those of manganese, 73% of chrome, 45% of vanadium and 41% of 
gold reserves. Only two strategic minerals, namely, crude oil and bauxite, are not available in the 
country…The country is also home to over 70% of the world’s chromium, which is an essential ingredient 
in the stainless steel used to house the catalyst and produce modern auto exhausts. This resource base 
produces in excess of 50% of the world’s ferrochrome’ (2008: 10). 
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largely not beneficiated but rather exported – only to return in the form of costly discrete 
parts or completed components or CBU vehicles. 
 
Figure 4.1 is an attempt to summarise this situation, starting with the mining industry, 
and depicting the movement of parts, components and CBU vehicles in the various stages 
of production from the viewpoint of commodity chains and the logistical revolution. 
Germany is used as a country example: Chapter 3 showed from AIEC data (2008) that 
Germany is South Africa’s main trading partner in the automotive industry, and 
accounted in 2007 for 30 per cent of OECs’ imports to South Africa; and in this depiction 
BMW is used as an example of an OEM. 
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Figure 4.1: The automotive industry and logistical revolution in concert 
 
Mining industry 
South Africa has vast mineral resources, which 
are mainly extracted for export as raw 
materials. The country is yet to advance full 
beneficiation.  
Export destinations 
For example, Europe including 
Germany; North America; China; 
and Japan 
Second and third tier suppliers 
For example: large-scale category one 
beneficiation takes place in Germany, China or 
anywhere in the form of the manufacture of the 
over 10 000 discrete parts that go into the over 
100 major components of CBU vehicles. This 
is carried out by second tier suppliers, mainly 
highly developed manufacturing specialists 
who obtain raw materials and other inputs from 
their selected third tier suppliers. 
 R&D are important for 
beneficiation  
In Europe, Germany, BMW HQ, 
Munich involves first tier suppliers 
in product R&D. Parts and 
components that go into CBU 
vehicles are designed in this 
process, which contributes to a 
complete vehicle design.  
BMW furnishes the respective first 
tier suppliers with specifications for 
components. The supplier that 
comes up with the best concept at 
the end of the product development 
process is selected for a supply 
contract. It is from there that other 
requirements such as cost, end 
product (components) quality and 
delivery are worked out.  
Once first tier suppliers have been 
selected, they select which of their 
own production facilities to allocate 
volumes, and select second tier 
suppliers, which in turn do the same 
and select third tier suppliers and so 
on.   
BMW South Africa, Rosslyn 
Rosslyn assembles 250 CBU vehicles per day. From 
over 500 suppliers it has globally, there are 52 first tier 
suppliers producing components from South Africa. But 
there are also second and third tier suppliers in this 
system. The rest are imported, and mainly from 
Germany, in one way or the other returning as finished 
parts and components from exported raw material.      
First tier suppliers  
Large-scale category two beneficiation takes 
place in the form of the manufacture and 
assembly of major BMW 3-series components 
by first tier suppliers e.g. in Germany using 
components sourced from their selected second 
tier suppliers.  
There is high 
volume production 
in Germany 
Components from 
first tier suppliers go 
into the assembly of 
CBU vehicles in 
Regensburg (1 100 
units/day), Munich 
(900 units/day) and 
Leipzig (600 
units/day). 
Not so much is beneficiated in South Africa 
Of the over 500 suppliers of BMW SA, there 
are only 52 first tier suppliers in SA. However, 
these have local second tier suppliers, which 
have local third tier suppliers. However, there 
are still imports of second and third tier 
supplies. 
Exports to USA via 
Europe first 
83% of Rosslyn’s 
production is for 
export to Japan, 
Australia, South 
Korea, Canada and 
the USA, which is 
the main export 
destination. Due to 
low volumes there is 
no direct line for 
these exports to the 
USA, therefore they 
go via Europe (EU) 
first. 
From EU, 
Rosslyn’s exports 
then head to 
their final main 
destination, USA 
Only 17% of 
BMW South 
Africa’s 
production is 
for local sales 
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4.1.3. Rosslyn, the logistical revolution and the production system 
 
Flor’s emphasis on the development of the supply base explains the position in which the 
Rosslyn-based assembly plant finds itself; i.e. in terms of the logistical cost component of 
the cost of production. It also explains one of the weaknesses of globally dispersed 
production. 
 
According to Flor (interview), the present production organisation in the automotive 
industry is such that about 75 per cent of value-adding activity in the automotive industry 
comes from suppliers. This means that OEMs’ value-adding activity to CBU vehicles is 
less, at 25 per cent. The shift in value-adding activity from OEMs to the supply side of 
the value chain was accomplished by means of outsourcing, as reflected briefly in 
Chapters 2 and 3.  
 
The 75 per cent value-adding activity that has been shifted to the supply side, read in 
context with the challenge of the lack of economies of scales as pointed out by Pitot 
(interview) and Flor (interview) and the underdeveloped supplier base (Flor interview) 
means that there is a substantial amount of importing of discrete parts and even 
components or modules that are simply less complex to transport from long overseas 
distances than to manufacture locally. As such, components assembly rather than 
components manufacturing appears to be largely occupying a significant portion of 
value-adding activity in the local supply base.   
 
According to Flor (interview), Rosslyn has about 500–700 suppliers. About 80 per cent 
of them are MNCs headquartered in Germany and elsewhere. Of BMW Rosslyn 
assembly plant’s first tier suppliers (excluding imports), only 52 are local and these also 
consist of MNCs that are supplying BMW globally. However, linked to production in the 
Rosslyn assembly plant there are also second, third and fourth tier suppliers locally. 
While the Rosslyn assembly plant plays its own role in local sourcing, particularly in 
terms of cost, quality and delivery requirements, just as in Regensburg, Munich plays a 
central role in terms of the strategy of global sourcing.  
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The shift in value-adding activity to the supply side of the automotive industry value 
chain has not only been accompanied by increased responsibility in various supply tiers 
for companies to coordinate their respective suppliers. According to Flor (interview), this 
shift now entails increased involvement of first tier suppliers in process and product 
development. In this (as depicted in Figure 4.1), for instance, BMW globally invites 
different first tier suppliers to Munich during product development from the outset. Cost, 
quality and delivery efficiency in terms of Just In Time (JIT) and Just In Sequence (JIS) 
are not the only determining requirements for supply contracts. 
 
During the product development process, for example, Munich furnishes suppliers with 
specifications for components or modules for new generation models, which ordinarily 
run for seven years (Flor interview). The supplier that comes out at the end of the process 
with the best design concept for a particular component or module is selected. Lack of 
capabilities in process and product development means that the affected companies – in 
this regard, suppliers – have limited or non-existent opportunities to be selected. This is 
part of the reason for the emergence of global suppliers19 (in other words, multinational 
suppliers) from global functional integration as pursued by OEMs in their globalisation of 
production. 
 
BMW Rosslyn assembly plant’s production system, VPS, has already been touched on 
briefly, in terms of the 100 per cent workload factor that is required of workers. VPS is 
BMW’s global production system, and therefore part of the strategy for standardisation 
under functional integration. However, different country conditions determine the impact, 
pace and extent to which elements of global production systems can be implemented. 
According to Konrad Siegel (interview), an IG Metall official who is also renowned as a 
German specialist in labour economics (International MTM Directorate 2005), in 
Germany work standards are not left to management as such; the union is also involved. 
It defends worker interests even in the design and implementation of work standards. In 
                                                 
19
 As reflected in Chapter 3 of the present study, from Sturgeon and Florida (2000) and Veloso and Kumar 
(2002). 
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the main, central to this is ensuring that work standards are fair, and prioritising the 
health and safety of both work and worker in terms of both short-term and life-long 
implications and repercussions. This involvement happens through participation in work 
standards-setting bodies such as a Methods Time Measurement (MTM) association, as 
well as through co-determination at plant level.  In South Africa, by contrast, this has not 
really been on the agenda. 
 
For instance NUMSA defends members in disciplinary hearings, bargaining councils and 
the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) against charges of 
poor work performance, or in cases of dismissal on the grounds of incapacity – but all 
according to work standards that have been determined by management.  
 
Negotiating work standards and standardising them across sectors can contribute to 
preventing negative impact of work. This negative impact could also be as a result of the 
elements of the production systems implemented by MNCs as they advance functional 
integration. Linked with this, Chapter 3 drew in, among others, a point made by Blum 
(2009): that MNCs that respect worker rights and labour standards in one country are not 
immune from undermining them in another. In order to engage on the issue of work 
standards, however, NUMSA would need to develop its capacity as well as alternative 
content with regard to work standards.    
 
In Rosslyn, BMW’s production system, VPS, has as its major elements JIT (and JIS), 
called kanban at Japan-based Toyota (Womack et al. 1990); continuous, incremental 
improvement (KVP), kaizen in Japanese (Womack et al. 1990); as well as an emphasis on 
elimination of waste – in Japanese, muda, which encompasses wasted effort, materials 
and time (Womack et al. 1990). The emphases drawn from Womack et al. (1990) are 
used to highlight the influence of lean production as pioneered by Toyota (discussed in 
Chapter 3). According to Flor (interview), BMW identified seven areas of waste: 
 Stocks – which must be eliminated between work and production processes. 
Hence the emphasis on JIT and JIS, both in-plant and from suppliers. 
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 Waiting – no worker must wait for parts, colleagues (punctuality) etc. This 
appears to be Ford’s ideal of the worker having every second necessary but no 
single second unnecessary. 
 Overproduction – and hence Production To Order (PTO). No vehicle is produced 
without an order. Thus, there are flexible production volumes in terms of market 
conditions – demand in the main.  
 Space – must not exceed the size of any respective production activity.  
 Walking – during work processes, workers should not walk or make movements 
that are non-value adding. In other words, automotive parts must be easily 
reachable by a hand, without any other bodily movement.   
 Transportation – all transportation that can be avoided must be avoided. 
Transportation cost must generally be reduced where it cannot be completely 
avoided. 
 Defects and rework – must be avoided.  
 
All of these areas are interlinked. Flor (interview) summarises this as follows: ‘Anything 
that a customer would not buy must be avoided during production. Everything must add 
the value that a customer would buy. Basically, it is for that which BMW invests in 
production’. As stated formerly when reflecting on the AP and absenteeism, some of the 
measures adopted to realise improvements in some of the above areas could, however, 
have a negative impact, in encouraging overwork. 
 
BMW South Africa and Methods Time Measurement  
In August 2008 I visited BMW South Africa’s Rosslyn assembly plant. At the time it was 
reported in a meeting that the company did not use MTM as part of its production system 
in Rosslyn. This was despite having adopted the system in Germany. During the current 
research visit, NUMSA shop stewards (interview: 9 December 2009) stated that the 
company is now using MTM. 
 
MTM was initially developed during the 1940s and became both the means of study for 
analysing work processes and motions, and a work organisation system for developing 
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manual work motions and procedures with predetermined times (International MTM 
Directorate 2005). MTM principles are related to ergonomics, its work motion 
specifications are based on work health and safety, and the approach is also adopted to 
optimise work processes. The system is unlike the stop watch system, which is often used 
to reduce work cycle times in order to increase workload and thereby intensify work.  
 
However, the International MTM Directorate (2005) recognises that as the system 
spreads, increasingly errors slip into its application. Therefore, like any other work 
methods system, MTM requires strong and capacitated unions (as described by Siegel, 
interview) in order to intervene in the design, development and alteration of work 
processes in the best interests of members. This further emphasises the need for the union 
to build capacity with regard to work and production organisation and associated change, 
including change in work processes. 
 
New investments and changes in work and production organisation 
In the automotive industry, the period between old model run-out and the introduction of 
new models is a critical one for new and major rounds of change in work and production 
organisation. This period also involves employers’ (which are mainly MNCs) demands 
for concessions from unions, in the name of securing production volumes that are 
centrally allocated from respective headquarters, and thus presents a challenge to unions 
such as NUMSA that have resolved to negotiate production volumes. 
 
When preparations for the present study were under way, BMW South Africa announced 
an investment of R2.2 billion for the Rosslyn assembly plant. This is mainly for 
facilitating the introduction of a BMW 3-series new generation model. According to Flor 
(interview), a third of this investment will go to infrastructure upgrading; another third to 
new processes and machinery, including body shop fixtures, robotics and new equipment 
generally; and the last third to tools to be used for new generation parts (especially body 
parts) by particular suppliers.  
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During this study I did not come across evidence in BMW Rosslyn’s assembly plant to 
suggest that NUMSA shop stewards have been involved in negotiations over the new 
plant machinery and are able to influence related change. The same applies in the case of 
the three BMW South Africa suppliers that are covered in this study: Venture, ZF 
Lemförder and Lear Corporation. 
 
The point concerning investment by BMW in tools to be used by suppliers is important to 
highlight. In other words, the situation is that the respective suppliers use their own 
machinery, but that the tools fitted on this machinery are not only for BMW models but 
are also BMW-owned. One reason for this, according to Flor (interview), is that should a 
supplier go bankrupt BMW does not want to be found wanting in terms of tools. 
Therefore, the thinking goes, owning the tools for its products supplied by the particular 
suppliers will provide BMW with leverage in terms of responding flexibly under such 
circumstances by swiftly changing suppliers.  
 
In terms of the labour process turned into a process whereby capitalists consume labour 
power, we have here one of the two characteristic phenomena identified by Marx 
(1990/1867), as discussed in Chapter 2 of this report:  
 
the worker works under the control of the capitalist to whom his labour belongs; 
the capitalist takes good care that the work is done in a proper manner, and the 
means of production are applied directly to the purpose, so that the raw material is 
not wasted, and the instruments of labour are spared, i.e. only worn to the extent 
necessitated by their use in the work. (Marx 1990/1887: 291) 
 
This phenomenon is extended by OEMs and applies also to situations where suppliers use 
tools (part of the instruments of labour) that belong to OEMs. Flor (interview) states that 
in the use of its tools, BMW demands accountability. As part of this, it also conducts 
frequent visits to respective suppliers to verify that its tools are ‘spared’; in Marx’s 
(1990/1867) words, ‘only worn to the extent necessitated by their use in the work’. BMW 
also wants its suppliers to follow its production system or adopt its elements. And in 
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terms of the cost component of its contract requirements, suppliers are required to reduce 
cost annually by 3–5 per cent on average.  
 
When generalised, these factors partly account for giving OEMs control and leverage that 
they use to effect changes in work and production organisation too in the supply side of 
the automotive industry value chain. Suppliers overwhelmingly depend on OEMs for 
business – and OEMs use this very fact to exercise control over suppliers. 
 
4.1.4. From rigid outsourcing to flexible insourcing: Rosslyn, its suppliers and 
NUMSA 
 
4.1.4.1. Flexible insourcing: how will NUMSA respond?  
 
The experiences of rigid outsourcing and the development of flexible production as 
characterised by lean production elements (for example, as are to be found in BMW’s 
production system, VPS) seem to contribute to a pendulum swing from rigid outsourcing. 
On this score, Siegel (interview) suggests that there seems to be a change in the definition 
of core and non-core operations, all within the context of flexibility. The shift from rigid 
outsourcing is not a shift to what can be termed ‘conventional insourcing’; rather, it is a 
shift to flexible insourcing. Part of the characteristics and determinants of flexible 
insourcing appears to be the balance of cost evidence and the character and units of 
competition (the competitive struggles between capitals in the same branch of industry 
for a market share) at each point in time. 
 
For reasons located in this broader perspective, Flor (interview) revealed that in the 
production of the next generation 3-series BMW, for which the R2.2 billion investment 
has been announced, the company will be insourcing the following components. 
 Headliners; 
 Front-ends, which consist of external front illuminating parts;    
 Cockpits and dashboards;  
 Parcel shelves; 
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 Centre consoles;  
 Brake pipes; and 
 Door trim panels.  
 
According to the company, when these components are assembled in-plant, the 
associated transport cost will be eliminated, while ensuring that quality is no longer 
jeopardised, and the JIT and JIS systems will function more effectively. In this way I find 
JIT consolidating, albeit flexibly, some of the previously geographically dispersed 
production activities. 
 
During the era of heightened outsourcing NUMSA opposed it. The new trend, of flexible 
insourcing, is likely to cause job losses somewhere down the value chain. This was an 
observation by NUMSA second vice president, Christine Olivier (meeting: 15 December 
2009),20 who also suggested that flexible insourcing merits further scrutiny. NUMSA’s 
response will be very interesting to monitor.  
 
4.1.4.2. BMW Rosslyn assembly plant, its suppliers and NUMSA 
 
In Rosslyn I also interacted in interview sessions with NUMSA shop stewards from 
surrounding BMW suppliers, namely Venture, ZF Lemförder and Lear Corporation. All 
three are MNCs. 
 
Venture  
Venture has been moulding front-ends, which has since been taken over by SAS 
Faurecia, also an MNC. Venture’s workforce that was involved in moulding front-ends 
was redeployed to the production of bumpers and side skirts, which are the main supplies 
of the company to BMW. According to NUMSA shop stewards (interview, 29 September 
2009), the company’s production facility in Rosslyn, where it employs about 200 
                                                 
20
 This meeting was convened to look at the report ‘Changes in Production Systems and Work Methods’ 
(Edward Webster, Alex Mashilo, Themba Masondo & Christine Bischoff 2009). This is a report of 
NUMSA’s broader study on work and production reorganisation. The study was conducted by the 
University of Witwatersrand-based Society, Work and Development Institute (SWOP), with Professor 
Emeritus Edward Webster as principal. 
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workers, also supplies Ford Motor Company (FMC) with bumpers along the same lines 
as it supplies BMW. The production of bumpers is labour intensive. 
 
ZF Lemförder 
ZF Lemförder assembles differentials, and front and rear wheel axles and supplies them 
to BMW. Production in this facility is more a case of component assembly than 
manufacturing. The parts that are assembled into complete sets of differentials, and front 
and rear wheel axles, are sourced from either second tier suppliers in South Africa or 
globally (as reflected above, in this chapter) including Germany, where ZF Lemförder’s 
main first tier plant also produces parts and components.  
 
Production at ZF Lemförder is capital intensive. This includes the use of Automated 
Guided Vehicles (AGVs). These are self-propelled vehicles that are programmed to move 
automatically from one workstation to another for workers to work on the component 
under production. The AVG has a fixture that holds the component under production on 
its passage from the beginning of the process to the end. The AGV in a way replaces 
where possible and plays the role of Ford’s moving conveyor.     
 
According to a NUMSA shop steward (interview: 24 November 2009), the company 
employs 148 workers in total. There are 78 union members, including only 1 white collar 
worker. 
 
Production in ZF Lemförder presents a classic case of production system linkage with 
BMW. The company’s continuous improvement (KVP) system, called the Lemförder 
Continuous Improvement Programme (LCIP), offers a reward of R500 for workers’ 
suggestions, most of which, according to a NUMSA shop steward (interview: 24 
November 2009) are cost cutting, although suggestions are encouraged in other areas as 
well, such as Total Quality System (TQS) and Total Preventive Maintenance (TPM).  
 
NUMSA general secretary, Irvin Jim (Central Committee: 27 July 2009) criticised 
continuous improvement – KVP or kaizen – measures implemented by corporations as 
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contributing to the destruction of jobs. This was during discussions following a progress 
report on a broader study on work and production reorganisation in the South African 
automotive and components industries and German experiences. There are delegates who 
called for the study to be expanded to other motor industry sectors, and to iron and steel 
and engineering industries.  
 
Despite the leading edge that the automotive industry occupies in terms of work and 
production reorganisation (whereby other industries take their cue from the automotive 
industry, as discussed in Chapter 3), this call was important for providing details on the 
realities in all the industries where NUMSA organises. By these various means the union 
wants ultimately to develop a coherent strategic response and build capacity on work and 
production reorganisation on an ongoing basis. NUMSA deputy general secretary, Karl 
Cloete, has been consistent on behalf of the other National Office Bearers (NOBs) in 
providing leadership with regard to this undertaking.  
 
From the interviews with shop stewards at BMW and its suppliers it is clear that there are 
incoherent approaches by NUMSA SSCs on corporations’ production systems. For 
example, in terms of KVP, and within it the use of worker suggestions, in some cases 
there are no rewards while in others (for example, at ZF Lemförder and BMW), there are. 
Without intervention in the form of a coherent strategy to guide all of its shop stewards 
across sectors, though, even the rewards could encourage suggestions that might end up 
posing challenges to the union (as touched upon in Chapter 3, using the example of VW). 
NUMSA is also yet to develop a strategic response on these rewards.  
 
A NUMSA shop steward (interview: 24 November 2009) at ZF Lemförder also stated 
that pressure is building up because the BMW 3-series model that they have been 
supplying will soon run out. As a result of this pressure, which includes increasing 
demands for cost cutting and quality, ZF Lemförder has asked workers to support it to 
acquire the supply of new generation components to BMW. This support requires that 
workers participate actively in, among other things: 
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 Reducing overtime hours by limiting breakdowns, improving punctuality and 
reducing absenteeism. (Again in this, as at BMW, causes of absenteeism were not 
interrogated.)  
 Reducing cycle time. This would mean increasing units per hour, and might lead 
to overwork and certainly to work intensification.  
 Improving quality. 
 
These are just part of automotive companies’ (both assembly and suppliers) requirements 
or demands for concessions from unions, particularly during times of old model run-out 
to support the competitive struggle for securing higher volumes for new models.  
 
Lear Corporation  
The stakes are up: welcome to confrontation at work 
 
My mother was a kitchen girl 
My father was a garden boy 
That’s why I’m a communist 
A communist 
 
These are the lyrics of a revolutionary song by striking workers at Lear Corporation (11 
November 2009). This song was used as a changeover between all the other songs. 
Workers continued protesting by singing revolutionary songs and, very interestingly, also 
gospel songs, and blowing whistles while working. Management tried to stop the singing 
and whistle-blowing but failed. Even when told that what they were doing could result in 
disciplinary hearings, the workers did not stop. The more they were told to stop the more 
they sang; they would stop in their own time.    
 
Lear Corporation: workforce profile 
Lear Corporation has one of its production facilities in South Africa located in the 
Automotive Supplier Park (ASP), a few minutes’ distance from the BMW assembly plant 
in Rosslyn. The company employs a total workforce of 772 including top, senior and 
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middle managers (NUMSA shop stewards interview: 11 November 2009). Of the total 
772 workers, 722 are blue collar workers, and the majority are female. And of the 722 
blue collar workers, 370 are employed under a labour broker, Express Professional 
Employment (EPE). This means that the majority of the company’s workforce at Lear 
Corporation in the ASP (51.25%), are under labour broker employment. The other two 
BMW suppliers that I considered, Venture and ZF Lemförder, have STCs. I found Lear 
Corporation to be a worse-case scenario in terms of the use of labour brokers, in that the 
majority of the workforce is employed under labour broking. 
 
During 2009, NUMSA had been one of the most campaigning unions – if not the leading 
campaigning union – in South Africa. This was not only in terms of its job security 
conferences and their subsequent programmes and campaigns in response to the global 
capitalist system crisis. It was also in terms of a campaign for the abolition of labour 
brokers.  
 
The union’s initial position on labour brokers was that they ‘should be regulated and 
workers in these sectors should enjoy full rights and benefits of full-time workers’ 
(NUMSA 1997: 13). NUMSA has managed to regulate labour brokers through collective 
bargaining, with a success in the engineering sector where workers under labour brokers 
are covered by the main collective bargaining agreement. However, the persistently harsh 
super-exploitation realities that workers experience under labour brokers had compelled 
the union to shift its stance completely: to demand that, and campaign for, labour brokers 
to be abolished once and for all.  
 
A worker (interview: 11 November 2009) at Lear Corporation recalls starting to work for 
the company in 1999. At that time, she explains, Lear Corporation acquired part of ALC 
Automotive. When she was employed it was under a labour broker, and there was no 
clear answer as to how long employment under the labour broker would last, and thus 
whether or not she, together with other affected workers, might be employed directly and 
permanently by Lear Corporation. They then joined NUMSA in their numbers and she 
was elected a shop steward.  
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The worker (interview: 11 November 2009) recalls that through the union they managed 
to move out of the labour broker to employment by Lear Corporation directly, and that in 
2000 they equalised wages (they earned low wages under the labour broker) and 
established a countrywide (i.e. ASP, and Brits and Port Elizabeth plants) Lear 
Corporation NUMSA SSC. Lear Corporation reversed their achievements when in 
2005/06 it instituted retrenchments, during which she took a Voluntary Separation 
Package (VSP). The worker cited loss of competition for a supply contract as one of the 
reasons behind the retrenchments; the company that won the contract was, according to 
the worker, paying low wages as it used labour brokers. 
 
When Lear Corporation re-recruited it used a labour broker, and hence the majority of its 
workforce are presently under this labour broker, EPE (worker interview: 11 November 
2009). As for her, she was re-recruited under EPE in 2009. Under EPE, they rate R10.00 
per hour less than permanent workers and, she emphasised, ‘for same, equal job and 
hours’. She did not mention the existence of any benefits. This makes it clear that 
flexibility is not the only outcome that employers using labour brokers, STCs and APs 
want. Cost cutting in terms of labour – in other words, pressing down variable capital and 
with it necessary labour – is among the underlying objectives. 
 
The worker (interview: 11 November 2009) believes that labour broking makes her share 
wages with somebody who does nothing but paperwork at EPE. In this way, therefore, 
she argues, labour brokers’ profit-making is driven by expropriating a portion of workers’ 
wages. She is determined to see labour brokers banned. Workers under the labour broker, 
EPE, at Lear Corporation are NUMSA members, and have elected their shop stewards, 
including her. For her this is an important step in carrying out workers’ coordinated 
struggle against exploitation.  
 
On 7 October 2009 South Africa’s Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Labour held 
hearings that I attended in Germiston (Gauteng Province). NUMSA general secretary, 
Irvin Jim, was the last to speak, late in the evening. This was after labour brokers had 
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made submissions to justify their existence and workers employed under labour brokers 
had made verbal submissions to oppose labour brokers. All of the workers related their 
firsthand personal experiences of brutalisation of work by labour brokers. They all called 
for labour brokers to be banned through an act of parliament. Irvin Jim categorically 
stated that should parliament not abolish labour brokers, NUMSA, as part of COSATU, 
would abolish them through a street-level revolution. He was also speaking on behalf of 
COSATU. 
 
Lear Corporation: production and production system  
Lear Corporation supplies complete seat systems to BMW. Assembling of seats requires, 
for example, parts such as foam pads, trim wires, frames, extrusions, threads, leather or 
textiles, harnesses (electric wire systems for electronic seat adjustment), airbags and seat 
heaters. Lear does not manufacture these parts itself. Like the other first tier suppliers, it 
sources parts from second tier suppliers. 
 
Using Lear Corporation as but one example of a First Tier Supplier (FTS) to BMW, 
Figure 4.2 depicts this scenario, with each part coming from its respective specialist 
Second Tier Supplier (STS). There are also some Third Tier Suppliers (TTS). The 
suppliers across all tiers would obviously multiply, were not only seats but all of the 
components supplied to BMW to be considered. Because of global sourcing, too, the 
geographic depiction of this prevailing scenario will make a complex chain of value-
adding activity – global production networks and logistics. 
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Figure 4.2: First tier supplies to BMW South Africa 
 
 
Except for the FTS, all other suppliers are suppliers of suppliers, as discussed in previous 
chapters. 
 
Lear Corporation uses Six Sigma methodology as part of its production system, in a bid 
to increase business performance, and has also adopted lean production. In this regard, 
for instance, NUMSA shop stewards mentioned KVP, Total Quality Management 
(TQM), and also JIT (along with JIS) – as depicted in Figure 4.2 by the arrows.  
 
JIT and JIS  
The supplies from the three suppliers (namely, Venture, ZF Lemförder and Lear 
Corporation) to BMW are delivered JIT and JIS, as BMW requires. To facilitate this, 
among other strategies the three suppliers have part of their workforce based full-time in 
BMW assembly plant premises, called a JIT Area. According to NUMSA shop stewards, 
BMW South Africa  
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from these suppliers and BMW, the suppliers’ workforce in BMW receives, conducts 
quality control on and sequences the respective supplies to assembly lines.  
 
Sequencing must be such that the supplies are delivered to assembly lines not only JIT, 
but also JIS. In terms of JIS, the supplies must be synchronous with the assembly line 
production schedule and match the component options required. For example: if a vehicle 
requires black leather seats and a white bumper, then no other seats but black leather 
seats and no other bumper but a white bumper must be delivered at respective 
workstations JIT. Sequencing and synchronisation are at the heart of JIS. Among other 
factors, design options and colour matching are central to JIS. 
 
The vulnerabilities of the JIT system  
On 11 November 2009 during my research visit to Lear Corporation, workers had not 
long returned from a temporary lay-off as a result of the global capitalist system crisis 
that led to recession and a downward spiral in production output. BMW also governs its 
supplies in terms of flexible production schedules. On this basis, the company cut down 
on supplies during the 2009 economic downturn, and hence the temporary lay-off in its 
supply chain. This affected Lear Corporation workers as well. 
 
Upon workers’ return from the temporary lay-off at Lear Corporation, the company 
implemented benefits deductions from affected workers’ first pay. This caused a dispute: 
on one side, workers claimed that ordinarily the company would not do that, but would 
pay the deductions for them; on the other, the company rejected the workers’ claim.  
 
The workers then embarked on strike action without following legislative procedures in 
terms of the LRA. Production stopped and no amount of pressure by the company could 
convince the highly militant NUMSA members to desist from the strike with immediate 
effect.  
 
Lear Corporation has a two-shift system that is synchronised with that of BMW; and it 
took almost the entire morning shift after the strike had begun to get workers to resume 
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production. The NUMSA Rosslyn organiser and the Local Office Bearers (LOBs) had to 
intervene through a Factory General Meeting (FGM). While this meeting (which I also 
attended) was taking place, the afternoon shift was already coming in and they, too, 
demanded clarity. An intense discussion leading to a near-stalemate broke out in the 
meeting. This was prompted by feedback from consultation with management. Part of the 
reasons why the deductions could not be reversed was that such a decision, according to 
management, did not fall under the jurisdiction of Lear Corporation in Rosslyn’s ASP, 
but was rather a decision to be made by the Lear Corporation’s Europe offices. As a 
result there was a strong view in this meeting that management in the ASP was not 
entitled to the name because it could not make financial decisions. The discussion of this 
took the meeting substantial time. There was also a proposal that until such a decision 
was made the strike must continue. It took a long time for the workers to decide finally to 
return to production – albeit slowly. This episode exposed the weak links within the 
centralisation of decision-making under MNCs’ headquarters or global regional offices, 
which is the driving strategy for functional integration; as well as the vulnerabilities of 
the JIT system. BMW was running production and needed seats from Lear Corporation.  
 
Again on 24 November (during my research visit to ZF Lemförder), a NUMSA shop 
steward reported that on 9 November 2009 BMW had had to stop production for about 25 
minutes because of wrong sequencing from ZF Lemförder. As is the case at Lear 
Corporation and other suppliers, ZF Lemförder’s production schedules and working time 
patterns are tied to those of BMW, with which they flexibly fluctuate as and when BMW 
presses any button, up or down.  
 
The wrong sequence from ZF Lemförder disrupted the JIT and JIS system, which 
thereafter had to be corrected, first for production to run smoothly between the supplier 
and BMW, and then within BMW itself. For this error, ZF Lemförder charged a worker, 
whom the union would have to represent. 
 
JIT (and JIS) was developed as a solution to production impediments and has advanced 
work and production organisation to new levels. However, as mentioned earlier, by virtue 
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of its inherent vulnerabilities the system itself presents impediments, which can provide 
unions with fresh grounds for developing new organising strategies. This is with 
particular reference to the power that unions can derive from the vulnerabilities of JIT as 
a logistical system. The application of this logistical power can thus be strategic for 
unions. 
 
JIT Areas and NUMSA 
From interviews with NUMSA shop stewards from BMW, ZF Lemförder, Lear 
Corporation and Venture I can, however, also conclude that NUMSA itself has not yet 
worked out a comprehensive new organising strategy in terms of a change in production 
organisation as reflected in JIT, particularly JIT Areas. 
 
For instance, despite the fact that workers from suppliers in JIT Areas – assembly plant 
premises – are NUMSA members, they are not coordinated. When the union convenes an 
FGM at BMW, these members do not attend. These members also do not attend when the 
union convenes FGMs in respective suppliers. They are just not invited. When NUMSA 
holds shop steward elections, these members are not there in their respective supplier 
premises to vote. Their respective NUMSA shop stewards from suppliers also reported 
that they had not visited the workers in the JIT Areas. 
  
4.2. BMW, Regensburg and Wackersdorf (Germany) 
 
IG Metall’s engagement on work and production organisation takes place in a different 
context to that of South Africa. The German industrial relations system can be 
characterised as a dual system: in an industry-wide sphere, unions negotiate wages and 
conditions; and in the plant-level sphere, Works Councils enforce labour regulations and 
collective agreements, and negotiate plant-level contracts within the legal context of co-
determination (Webster et al. 2009).  
 
This approach differs fundamentally from the situation that pertains in the NUMSA 
context, where bargaining is sector- and even employer-based, but where the two 
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functions – namely, wage and conditions negotiations, on the one hand, and enforcement 
of labour regulations and collective bargaining agreements, and negotiation of plant-level 
agreements, on the other – rest directly with the union. At the plant level, NUMSA 
exercises this through shop stewards and SSCs. However, and as further discussed in this 
section, the report by Webster et al. (2009) suggests that IG Metall is in charge of the 
Works Councils. This to some extent minimises the difference between how the two 
unions operate, except with regard to co-determination, which is also further reflected on 
in this section. 
 
Regensburg and the Wackersdorf components plant 
BMW has a components plant in Wackersdorf, which is situated 60 km from the 
Regensburg assembly plant. 
 
The Wackersdorf plant produces dashboards for BMW 3-series and supplies them to 
Regensburg and other BMW plants. It directly employs 800 workers, 400 of whom are in 
production. The other 400 are in logistics, dedicated to shipping, exports and other 
logistical functions. 
 
The Regensburg assembly plant directly employs 8 700 workers. It has a training centre 
with 300 apprentices. Next to the training centre in the assembly plant is a daycare centre 
for workers’ children. Very interestingly, especially after the era of rigid outsourcing, the 
canteen in Regensburg is owned and operated by the company directly, and thus the 
workers in the canteen are employed directly by BMW. Food from the canteen is also 
subsidised. (Meal prices range from €2.50. Outside they range from €7.00.) 
 
According to Johannes Metz (interview and presentation), a Works Council member and 
IG Metall shop steward, the workforce in Regensburg and Wackersdorf together totals 9 
500. Approximately 6 300 of those, inclusive of both blue and white collar workers, 
called ‘associates’ (as in Rosslyn, according to Masondo 2003) are IG Metall members. 
Unlike NUMSA, IG Metall has significant presence among white collar workers. The 
union leverages the technical skills base of its members in all employment categories and 
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at all levels to formulate, advance and defend its positions on changes in work and 
production organisation. 
 
The German system of labour relations and co-determination provides for a Works 
Council. Elections are held periodically and are contested by unions (where more than 
one union exists) as well as by individual workers. A Workplace Forum as legislated in 
South Africa’s LRA is in a way similar to the Works Council system. However, South 
African unions under COSATU, NUMSA included, have consciously decided not to 
trigger this model because of the disadvantages it might have under South African 
conditions of the history of the apartheid workplace regime. 
 
In BMW Regensburg assembly and Wackersdorf components supply plants, IG Metall 
has 300 shop stewards. In the 37-member Works Council, 36 are IG Metall members. IG 
Metall is overwhelmingly the majority union not only at BMW, both Regensburg and 
Wackersdorf, but also in each of the respective sectors in which it organises (as reflected 
in Chapter 3). This is confirmed, for example, by other automotive assembly and 
components companies that I visited as part of the research tour. In the 13 195-strong 
workforce at VW’s fully-fledged component manufacturing plant in Kassel, where the 
union has 450 shop stewards, of the 39-member Works Council, 35 are IG Metall 
members. In the 5 514-strong workforce at Mercedes Benz in Rastatt assembly plant, all 
33 Works Council members are IG Metall members; and in the 6 555-strong workforce 
of Mercedes Benz Rastatt’s and Gaggenau’s fully-fledged components manufacturing 
plants, where IG Metall has 330 shop stewards, of a joint 33-member Works Council, 30 
are IG Metall members. In terms of IG Metall shop steward policy, all of its members 
who are forwarded to Works Councils are automatically shop stewards (BMW 
Regensburg Works Council presentation: 13 July 2009). Thus, over and above taking 
charge of Works Councils, IG Metall has strong leadership presence at shop floor level, 
as the numbers illustrate.  
 
However, the big workforce numbers from which IG Metall derives its membership 
reflect a structurally strong economy and the contribution of the automotive industry to 
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employment in the country. Germany’s economy is far superior to South Africa’s. 
Germany’s economic position was briefly discussed in Chapter 3. As Straubhaar (2007) 
points out: ‘Germany is one of the most highly developed industrial nations in the world 
and, after the USA and Japan has the world’s third largest national economy’ (2007: 91).  
 
To return to IG Metall’s strong leadership presence on the shop floor, its many shop 
stewards play an important role in the direct and indirect linkages that the union’s Works 
Council members have with the rest of the workforce. The IG Metall Works Council 
members regularly meet with the union’s other shop stewards to discuss the state of 
upcoming developments and to share perspectives. 
  
Consistent with legislative provisions, the Works Council has, among its committees, a 
Works Committee. This committee has 11 members who, together with 2 others, serve on 
a full-time basis. ‘But in practice all other members of the Works Council are full-time’, 
asserts the Works Council (presentation: 13 July 2009). The Works Council determines 
its other committees and their roles. Interestingly, there is a committee called Ideas 
Committee. This can be seen as a direct organising response to the way companies are 
adopting lean production – especially KVP – and, within it, worker suggestions.  
 
The Ideas Committee is involved in monitoring worker suggestions that management 
gather in terms of KVP. The committee monitors the impact that each one of these 
suggestions could have before they can be implemented. However, once the Ideas 
Committee is satisfied that a suggestion will not bring about unintended consequences it 
attaches a monetary value to it and the company must pay for adopting it. Not all 
suggestions have the same value. In this way the union can be said to be intervening to 
mitigate exploitation at the level of brain work and preventing its outcomes from being 
used negatively, i.e. against other workers. So there is gold in workers’ heads that needs 
protection; this is the approach that the Works Council has taken. 
 
The production system in Regensburg and Wackersdorf is the same as in Rosslyn – VPS. 
This reflects global functional integration. In this, though, the union uses the Works 
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Council to intervene in work process design and work organisation changes. For this it 
draws on the existing work organisation institutions as discussed, such as the German 
MTM Association and co-determination at plant level.   
 
BMW Regensburg: production capacity and system 
The Regensburg assembly plant produces two BMW models: the 1-series and the 3-
series. Unlike Rosslyn, Regensburg has its own Press Shop, where automotive body 
platforms and mainframes are manufactured from metal sheets that are sourced from the 
supply base. Small automotive body parts are sourced completed. 
 
Within the company’s product variety, there are some derivatives that use similar under-
body platforms. This provides the company with technological flexibility in so far as 
certain stages of manufacturing and assembly operations are concerned. This means that 
at some stages of the production process such models are worked on using the same 
technological instruments and workstations. 
  
As in Rosslyn, the Regensburg assembly plant is highly automated and production is 
capital intensive. However, the Regensburg workstations are constructed according to 
ergonomic standards. And according to the Works Council (plant tour: 14 July 2009), 
workstations continue to be modified in terms of evolving ergonomic standards. The 
Regensburg assembly plant lines have, for instance, the moving conveyor lines 
automatically lifting units for workers’ reach without requiring workers to bend (bending 
could have long-term health and safety repercussions for the worker). The Works 
Council’s emphasis on ergonomics, health and safety standards is also used as a strategy 
to engage the company as and when it wants to introduce new or to alter existing 
machinery.  
 
Just as in Rosslyn, in the Regensburg assembly plant non-value adding movements in 
terms of VPS are eliminated from work processes. Here, however, the Works Council 
exercises its capacity to intervene. According to a questionnaire I left behind, which was 
completed and then emailed back to me, through intervening with the right level of 
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capacity the Works Council is able to avoid work intensification, which is a health and 
safety hazard. In the absence of capacitated intervention by unions, companies can use 
work intensification as a measure to raise productivity. 
 
A problem that the Works Council reported, though, is work monotony. In response to 
this the Works Council has ensured that there are rest times (6.5% personal time) during 
work processes and, in addition, that there is a rotational system to avoid repetitive strain 
injuries. However, the Works Council reported that it has yet to deal decisively with work 
monotony because this has many aspects to it, including the fact that it renders work 
uninteresting.  
 
The Works Council has also ensured that the company builds special workstations. 
Called social workstations, these are work areas that are adapted to accommodate 
workers with disabilities, workers with particular health issues (e.g. workers who have 
just returned to work from surgery), and those older workers who are about to retire and 
who are not able to conduct their work on ordinary production lines due to a medical 
condition. 
 
As reflected in Chapter 3 (in the section on union membership), unlike NUMSA, which 
has a young membership profile, the majority of IG Metall’s members are old workers. 
This reflects life expectancy rates in the two countries. According to Stats SA (2009a), 
the country’s life expectancy at birth is on average estimated at 53.5 years for males and 
57.2 years for females; and according to the Federal Republic of Germany’s (2007) 
official booklet, Facts about Germany, the country’s life expectancy is on average 77 
years for males and 82 years for females.   
 
BMW Regensburg assembly plant and its suppliers, and Works Council responses 
Regensburg coordinates over 550 suppliers, including BMW’s Wackersdorf components 
plant. As if it is not part of BMW, the Wackersdorf components plant is placed in 
competition independently of other suppliers. This means that to secure components from 
BMW headquarters (Munich), Wackersdorf has to comply with the requirements to cut 
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costs by 3–5 per cent per annum, improve productivity, reduce transport costs, and meet 
quality standards and delivery schedules through JIT, as BMW requires of all its 
suppliers. These are the same requirements that apply to suppliers in Rosslyn, as already 
discussed.  
 
As in Rosslyn, Munich plays a global sourcing role for the entire company through its 
global central sourcing department. The Works Council (presentation: 13 July 2009) 
states that notwithstanding Munich’s central role in sourcing, the company’s assembly 
plants are also allowed to procure components on their own provided that such will come 
at lower cost, high quality and the same delivery standards (namely, JIT). The same 
situation pertains in Rosslyn. 
 
The Works Council (presentation: 13 July 2009) points out that the economies of scale 
that suppliers sourced by Munich have in place constitute a competitive advantage over 
suppliers at the assembly plant level. In this way, global sourcing remains BMW’s key 
defining feature in terms of the governance and coordination of the supply chain. 
 
The strategy of global sourcing is correlated with multinationalisation of suppliers. This 
has already been discussed under the section on Rosslyn. In addition, global sourcing 
allows for supplies to be sourced from areas where production costs are low, and thus at 
low cost. Barnes (interview) states that the cost of material inputs (raw materials) is 
restricted as it is controlled by the market on different workings, and therefore that 
suppliers do not have control over it as such. Thus, apart from economies of scale and 
productivity,21 pressing down variable capital and along with it necessary labour22 is one 
of the central instruments for low cost production. 
 
In terms of further impact on workers, pressures that OEMs exert on suppliers compel the 
latter to respond by restructuring, which affects workers.  
                                                 
21
 Productivity, as discussed in Chapter 2, can be raised by reducing necessary labour time, i.e. the time it 
takes under particular social conditions, including skills and instruments of labour, to produce a particular 
commodity. 
22
 ‘Variable capital’ and ‘necessary labour’ – in this instance, this means wages and the time it takes to 
produce them. 
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Changes in the assembly plant compel the supply chain to adapt. For example, production 
capacity underutilisation in Regensburg as a result of the economic crisis in 2009 resulted 
in the assembly plant reconfiguring hours of work and shift-work patterns. Hours of work 
were cut down and a three-shift (relay) working pattern was converted into a two-shift 
pattern. The principle of flexible production, which is underpinned by the flexible supply 
volumes requirement that is demanded of suppliers by the assembly plant, leaves the 
Works Council (which, as we have seen, in this case effectively means the union) and 
with it the union itself in the supply chain with very little room to manoeuvre in terms of 
changes imposed by assembly plants. The same applies in Rosslyn between BMW and its 
suppliers. 
 
This principle ties fluctuations in production volumes of the assembly plant to 
components suppliers, and transfers such fluctuations with very little delay to those 
suppliers. In the forward linkage (sales of CBU vehicles) it is based on PTO and on the 
backward linkage it is based on a components pull system – no components are sourced 
without vehicles to build. This is among the factors that lead to what Bonacich and 
Wilson (2008) argue is contingent production, which has negative impact on workers; for 
example, in terms of temporary lay-offs during downturns. However, the impact of 
temporary lay-offs on workers is dependent, among other things, on union organising, 
bargaining strategies and content, and country context. 
 
For example, in Germany the unemployment social security system is designed to 
intervene by augmenting wages when there is a cut in hours of work during downturns. 
The Works Council (presentation: 13 July 2009) in Regensburg stated that the 
unemployment social security system pays 60–67 per cent of wages lost due to reduction 
of working hours as a result of downturns. 
  
As in Rosslyn, in Regensburg and Wackersdorf BMW has a WTA, the savings from 
which are used to top up the social security benefit. Unlike in Rosslyn, though, the WTA 
account in Regensburg-Wackersdorf is negotiated, as Flor (interview) states. There is 
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something interesting here, however; the WTA in Regensburg-Wackersdorf operates in 
one way and in Rosslyn in another way, in that the Rosslyn workers are not entitled to 
particular benefits to which workers in Regensburg-Wackersdorf are entitled. 
 
For example, under the WTA agreement in Regensburg-Wackersdorf (unlike in Rosslyn), 
should employment be terminated for any reason, including resignation, the company 
simply writes off any negative balance that might have been made under an advance, 
instead of recovering it from the worker’s separation funds.  
 
Further, in Regensburg-Wackersdorf, the Works Council monitors overtime trends. This 
is not just across the whole workforce but also across individual workers. In terms of this, 
the Works Council can advise a worker to stop working overtime. This could happen 
when the worker is exceeding the maximum overtime hours that can be banked. Again, 
unlike in Rosslyn, hours banked can be used for vacation leave. If overtime is becoming 
perpetual, the Works Council calls on the company to bring in trainees from the training 
centre, or (which can be a controversial issue) to employ temporary workers for the 
duration that specific overtime is likely to last. 
 
By these measures the Works Council seeks to prevent the potential negative impacts of 
the WTA as an instrument of flexibility.  
 
Penalisation of suppliers for non-compliance  
Another factor defining coordination of activities between the Regensburg assembly plant 
and its suppliers is penalties – the extreme penalty being cancelling the supply contract. 
With regard to the Rosslyn assembly plant, Flor (interview) stated that, particularly when 
old contracts expire, they are often not renewed. In Regensburg, if components from a 
supplier are found to be below the quality standard, from that moment on the assembly 
plant conducts consistent quality routines on that supplier’s components. The supplier is 
compelled to pay for this. Should quality not improve on two occasions, the contract from 
that supplier is terminated and placed on auction. Once this happens, that particular 
supplier’s workers stand to lose their jobs.  
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Combined with hyper-competition, pressures from assembly plants can mount to a point 
where a supplier faces a real threat of closing down (Works Council presentation: 13 July 
2009). In such circumstances there is a general bargaining arrangement called Pforzheim. 
This is the equivalent of the exemption provision in the NUMSA bargaining landscape. 
In terms of Pforzheim, employers are allowed to apply to the head office of the union via 
locals for an exemption that would permit them to pay wages below the provisions of the 
industry-wide collective bargaining agreement. As required by the union, the Pforzheim 
process must be public. The union appoints its own auditors to verify the affected 
company’s books. Exemption is limited and short-term in nature. The union demands a 
turnaround strategy before considering an application for exemption. This strategy must 
not pass loss on to workers; if it does, exemption is denied. 
 
In NUMSA’s case, exemption applications are not made to the union directly but to the 
bargaining council. 
 
Regensburg and Wackersdorf: bargained and flexible insourcing 
This sub-section examines insourcing of illuminating components, and regular meetings 
between the Works Councils of the assembly plant in Regensburg and the supply chain 
Works Councils, as well as IG Metall’s response to productivity and related restructuring.  
Regensburg-Wackersdorf assembly and components plants Works Council adopted 
insourcing as part of a strategy to counteract any reduction in the workforce that could 
result from productivity improvements and work and production organisation changes. 
The same was found with regard to the Works Councils of VW in the Kassel components 
plant, and Mercedes Benz in the Rastatt assembly and components plants and the 
Gaggenau component plants during the research visit for NUMSA’s broader project on 
work and production reorganisation (Webster et al. 2009).   
 
At BMW, dashboards and illuminating components were previously outsourced. As a 
result of the pressure from the Works Council in terms of the productivity agreement, the 
company was compelled to insource the new-generation dashboard of the 1-series model. 
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This means that when the new 1-series model is launched, Wackersdorf will be producing 
the new dashboard, in addition to the 3-series model that it is currently producing. 
  
According to Siegel (interview), on the subject of upcoming insourcing in Rosslyn, the 
insourcing of dashboards reflects a change in the definition of what companies referred to 
as ‘core operations’ at the height of rigid outsourcing. In addition, dashboards are now 
viewed as offering a competitive advantage. With new discoveries in information and 
communication technology, automotive vehicle dashboards have come to occupy a 
cutting edge position in the competitive struggle. Although a trend in the automotive 
industry is that new developments in one brand are followed by the same developments 
in other brands, the company that moves first gains a short-lead competitive advantage. 
Dashboards are now integrated modules that include mobile phone devices, navigation 
systems, parking aids, DVDs, digital rather than analogue components and so on. 
 
The Works Council demand for insourcing was endorsed by a newly appointed 
Regensburg assembly plant director in a Workers’ Assembly (General Meeting) that I 
attended (14 July 2009). Addressing the meeting, the plant director stated that one of his 
objectives was to develop the plant to manufacture other components in-house. In this 
way, insourcing has been made part of the company’s strategy in Regensburg and 
Wackersdorf. As reflected under Rosslyn, though, this shift appears as flexible 
insourcing. In Regensburg, BMW appears to be using this shift as a bargaining chip, to 
try to draw concessions from the Works Council. 
 
Works Councils: responding to the pressures of work and production changes 
The Works Council in the Wackersdorf components plant demanded a joint Works 
Council with the Regensburg assembly plant because both the facilities belong to BMW 
(Works Council presentation: 13 July 2009). This response came as a result of pressures 
exerted by the OEM over the supply chain, in which the Wackersdorf components plant 
had been, as highlighted, placed independently in direct competition with other suppliers. 
Now the two Works Councils form a joint Works Council – the Regensburg-Wackersdorf 
Works Council. This Works Council is used strategically to try to offset BMW’s own 
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components plant in Wackersdorf from the general pressure that the company exerts over 
its supply chain. 
  
The BMW Regensburg-Wackersdorf Works Council also reported that it holds meetings 
with the Works Councils of other suppliers. These meetings are used to share information 
and develop collective responses. One of the challenges that face these meetings is that 
the assembly plant Works Council is unable to intervene in terms of which supplier 
should get a contract, and by design it cannot. Again, even if a supplier is awarded a 
contract, there is no guarantee regarding to which of its plants the supplier will award 
production volumes. The suppliers also have multiple production plants that are in 
competition with one another. The one among the company’s plants that illustrates a 
competitive advantage gets awarded the contract or the greater portion of its volumes. 
The Works Council (presentation: 14 July 2009) in Regensburg also reported that there is 
a deepening problem of brokered labour in the supply chain. IG Metall is still searching 
for ways to respond to this.  
 
Similarly, as assembly plants squeeze their own dispersed plants and suppliers so too the 
suppliers squeeze their own dispersed plants and suppliers. As already discussed, Flor 
(interview) underlined the pressure exerted on the BMW Rosslyn assembly plant from 
this internal competition (i.e. intra-MNC global competition).  
 
Very interestingly, in another company, the VW Kassel Works Council (presentation: 6 
July 2009) reported that their response to this phenomenon is that they do not take 
contracts shifted from the company’s other plants. They extended this to strike situations; 
that is to say, if one of the VW plants is hit by a strike, the VW Kassel Works Council 
does not accept additional volumes shifted and overtime prompted by such a strike.  
 
There is a wealth of data available with regard to unions deliberately exploiting the 
vulnerabilities of the JIT system, not only in the BMW Rosslyn and Regensburg cases, 
but also in other plants in Germany that were not part of the scope of my study but were 
included in the research visit. These plants are Mercedes Benz (three plants, one for 
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assembly, and the other two for components in Rastatt and Gaggenau) and VW (for 
components, in Kassel). IG Metall’s strike action in Rastatt is a classic example of the 
union consciously exposing the vulnerabilities of the JIT system, and for this reason is 
worth citing here.  
 
IG Metall (Rastatt): exposing the JIT system’s vulnerabilities 
IG Metall’s LOB in Gaggenau, Roman Zitzelsberger (interview), recalls an incident 
where one of the suppliers refused – on the basis of non-recognition – to bargain with the 
union. The union responded with strike action. Mercedes Benz in the nearby Rastatt 
assembly plant could not obtain its parts JIT and had to stop production. Flexible 
production principles meant that the company had to stop all of its JIT supplies. For this 
reason, Mercedes Benz and the other affected suppliers, according to Zitzelsberger, all 
exerted pressure on the intransigent supplier for jeopardising production by refusing to 
bargain with the union. Within three hours the supplier had done a complete about-turn, 
inviting the union to talks; and subsequently the supplier has been compliant. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CAPITAL, REAL SUBORDINATION AND LABOUR 
 
Throughout this report and all of its chapters I have presented findings and conclusions, 
but some merit further emphasis. 
 
Economic exploitation for private capital accumulation and the competitive struggle that 
is fiercely taking place between capitals for the maximum surplus-value are part of the 
defining elements of the base. Global functional integration is part of the central 
superstructure drivers of changes in work and production organisation in the automotive 
industry, under globalisation processes (as discussed in Chapter 3).  
 
In this, while standardising what is beneficial to them and demanding flexibility, 
Multinational Corporations (MNCs) in the automotive industry tend to differently treat 
what is beneficial to workers. This results in disparities in conduct in different countries. 
The differential application of a Working Time Account (WTA) by BMW partly 
illustrates this point. In the Regensburg assembly and Wackersdorf components plants 
(Germany), if employment is terminated the company simply writes off any negative 
balance due by workers in terms of the WTA company advance payments. Yet, in the 
Rosslyn assembly plant (South Africa), the company recovers this negative balance. This 
is despite the fact that, unlike Germany, South Africa does not have a social security 
benefit for workers during temporary lay-offs that companies implement under conditions 
of business and economic crisis or downturn.  
 
With global functional integration by MNCs there is a shift of strategic production and 
managerial decision-making to MNC headquarters. Particularly affected are some critical 
issues that NUMSA resolved (in its 5th National Congress 1996 and Policy Conferences 
1997) must be negotiated. These issues include the following (NUMSA 1997):  
 Strategic business plans; 
 Production systems and, along with them, introduction of new technology, use of 
machines and line speed; 
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 Benchmarks, targets and production schedules; 
 Product development; 
 Work organisation and work processes; 
 Company and organisational structure; 
 Human resource planning; and 
 Productivity and performance assessment. 
 
Before proceeding with further concluding reflections, I wish to qualify my inclusion of 
human resource planning in this list of issues. At BMW South Africa, the representatives of 
hourly human resource management agreed, in a consultation meeting with the NUMSA 
Shop Steward Committee (SSC) – that without the Short Term Contracts (STCs) there was 
not full capacity available to run production. Nevertheless the company, pending a decision 
from BMW headquarters (Munich), rejected the NUMSA SSC’s demand for STCs to be 
converted into permanent employment, i.e. indefinite contracts of employment. 
 
Further, at Lear Corporation in Rosslyn’s Automotive Supplier Park (ASP), management 
rejected workers’ demands on temporary lay-off related deductions and payment, 
pending a decision from the company’s Europe offices. 
 
These human resource planning issues are among the financial decisions that are 
centralised under the headquarters of MNCs.  
 
However, despite NUMSA’s 5th National Congress and policy conferences generally on 
restructuring issues, neither in Rosslyn (South Africa), nor indeed at any of the companies 
that I looked at in South Africa did I find much evidence to suggest that the issues as 
emphasised above are receiving the attention that the union envisaged. 
 
Using BMW as an example of a German MNC, differences between NUMSA and IG 
Metall can explain this. The German dual system of industrial relations, which provides 
for co-determination, allows for the representation of the workforce through Works 
Councils on company-level supervisory boards. By winning places on Works Councils, 
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IG Metall is able to find its way onto supervisory boards, which is where corporate 
governance decisions are made. Although the system is such that the majority of board 
members are shareholder representatives, by providing for the presence of Works Council 
representatives the system at least allows for the voice of the workers to be heard. 
Nevertheless, given the character of the capitalist mode of production (as discussed in 
Chapter 2), decisions ultimately go the way of the shareholders.  
 
What unions require in order to influence decisions is a genuine worker participation 
model. The conditions for such a model to exist are limited under the capitalist mode of 
production. The real power of unions, therefore, continues to rest on their membership, 
coherent strategies with alternative content, and proper tactics that take into consideration 
the space and limitations of the day. In this regard I find it important to highlight one of 
the options suggested by Webster et al. (2009).  
 
Termed ‘strategic unionism’ (Webster et al. 2009), under this option unions can develop 
their own agenda on work and production organisation. This agenda, it is suggested, 
should cover the workplace level, industry level and global level, and should have clearly 
defined and articulated alternative content, and strategies for engagement with 
companies, fraternal and affiliated organisations, and communities. As part of this, it is 
further suggested that where they have not yet started, unions can consider the following: 
 Building capacity in research and development and providing for a dedicated 
focus on work and production organisation. 
 Constantly monitoring work and production organisation.  
 Devising alternatives in advance and, beyond being defensive, formulating and 
advancing demands in the interests of the worker. 
 Conducting systematic training for shop stewards. 
 
The suggestion regarding global-level engagement is even more important under the 
globalisation of production through functional integration. This would definitely require 
the action of more than one union globally and not only the unpacking of the weak links 
in companies’ centralisation of decision-making at their respective headquarters. It would 
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also have to confront the question of different national laws that apply to workers and 
tend to constrain them in terms of global struggles, whereas increasingly the movement 
of goods is governed (as discussed in Chapter 3), by a more or less similar global regime.  
 
The global-level engagement strategy has to be linked to action in national settings, at 
industry and company levels.  
 
Tactical approaches, as emerged during the course of the strike at Lear Corporation, can 
be refined, developed and given leadership. Despite the fact that it was in the context of 
an unprocedural strike, workers at Lear Corporation were refusing to stop the strike partly 
pending a decision from the company’s Europe offices. Management in the production 
facility based at the company’s Rosslyn ASP did not have decision-making authority. 
 
Further, the functional integration strategy, particularly centralisation of key decisions in 
MNCs’ respective headquarters, leads to workers undermining local management as the 
latter’s decision-making authority is restricted. Centralisation of strategic decision-
making at MNCs’ respective headquarters has the effect of reducing local management to 
mere messengers of union demands and headquarters’ decisions – to and fro between the 
two. This is a weak link in the chain, and unions can develop strategies on how to exploit 
it. This requires further work. 
 
On the other hand, unlike the case of public sector unions, where decisions are made 
within national settings, or the case of unions in developed countries that headquarter 
MNCs, industrial unions such as NUMSA in developing countries that do not 
headquarter MNCs in specific areas of production are confronted with the challenge of 
developing responses to the shift in and centralisation of strategic decision-making to 
MNCs’ headquarters.  
 
Discussing WTA and the stance of the NUMSA SSC not to negotiate it (which led to the 
WTA being only a voluntary scheme in BMW Rosslyn’s assembly plant), Flor (in an 
interview on 11 November 2009) indicated that decision-making must be faster as part of 
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flexibility, to respond to rapidly changing market conditions. In this regard, the non-
negotiation stance by the NUMSA SSC constitutes an impediment to accumulation, albeit 
also having other implications for the union in terms of effectively safeguarding worker 
interests. Again, though, unions are likely to reject faster decision-making on the 
decisions that benefit companies – when the decisions that benefit workers stand to be 
subjected to long processes on the part of MNCs’ respective headquarters. The case of 
the strike at Lear Corporation (as discussed in Chapter 4) already indicates this.  
 
Another weak link and impediment in the production chain is to be found, as Barnes 
(interview) points out, in the fact that automotive OEMs are adopting and even imposing 
over their suppliers, flexible production – as a superior way of organising work and 
production. Within flexible production, particularly noteworthy are flexible sourcing of 
supplies, i.e. pull sourcing: no supplies are sourced without production running where 
they are required in the value chain; Production to Order (PTO); and interlinked to both 
of the former, lean production, including specifically Just In Time (JIT) and Just In 
Sequence (JIS).  
 
The strike that affected the Mercedes Benz assembly plant in Rastatt (Germany); the 
Strike at Lear Corporation in Rosslyn’s ASP in South Africa; and the wrong sequencing 
at ZF Lemförder in Rosslyn (all discussed in Chapter 4) exposed the vulnerabilities of 
both pull sourcing and PTO – no vehicles are produced without customer orders. Further, 
the vulnerabilities of JIT and JIS, as well as both flexible pull sourcing of components 
and supply of Complete Built Up (CBU) vehicles on the basis of PTO, logically or by 
extension, were also exposed. JIT and JIS, flexible pull sourcing of components and PTO 
make it possible for a strike in a company that is located in the automotive industry value 
chain to cause an instant stoppage in the entire value chain. This phenomenon furnishes 
unions with a strategic source of power. 
 
Pull Sourcing, PTO and JIT represent important elements of capital’s solutions to 
accumulation impediments that arose under mass production. Yet these solutions 
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themselves have vulnerabilities that simultaneously represent or give rise to new 
impediments to accumulation. 
 
Under pull sourcing, PTO and JIT in the automotive industry, for example, when one 
supplier stops, the assembly plant company – Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) –
also has to stop production because of the shortage of associated supplies. As such, back 
the value chain the OEM has to stop other suppliers in terms of pull sourcing. The 
suppliers in turn have to apply the same action to their own suppliers. At the same time, 
the OEM is placed in a situation where, forward in the value chain, it is unable to meet 
customer orders, which underpin PTO.   
 
This whole regime potentially offers unions a source of logistical power. 
 
It is worth emphasising, though, that NUMSA has not developed a new organising 
strategy in view of JIT. Neither did I find differently with regard to IG Metall. Rather, the 
actions that exposed the vulnerabilities of the JIT system did not come as a result of 
comprehensive strategies but either as a coincidence or as a spontaneous reaction to a 
problem. Unions can rectify this by constantly studying changes in work and production 
organisation and developing medium- to long-term organising strategies, for instance, 
that include a focus on new sources of power, such as logistical power. In line with 
Webster et al. (2008), I want to argue that vital to this is the building of worker power, 
strong local campaigning that is linked with communities and a global unionism that 
challenges the logic of capital.  
 
In the case of IG Metall and the automotive industry value chain, and specifically the 
linkage between OEMs and suppliers, I did find some level of coordinated response on 
challenges from pressures exerted by OEMs over suppliers. There are regular direct 
meetings between the Works Councils of OEMs and their suppliers to look at 
developments and plan ahead. These meetings augment union local meetings that are 
attended by shop stewards across sectors.  
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In the case of NUMSA, though, I did not find direct interaction between the SSCs, for 
instance of BMW and its suppliers. Neither did I find the SSCs of suppliers servicing the 
unions’ membership in JIT Areas – assembly plant companies where part of suppliers’ 
workforce is located to receive, conduct quality control and sequence respective supplies 
to assembly lines. Thus, over and above defining a new organising strategy in view of 
JIT’s vulnerabilities, unions also have areas for improvement. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4 when reflecting on BMW’s adoption of one of the industrial 
work organisation programmes – Methods Time Measurement (MTM) – I did not find 
evidence suggesting that NUMSA shop stewards were able to intervene effectively in this 
highly technical area. The automotive industry National Bargaining Forum (NBF) 
agreement does make provision for shop stewards to choose to undergo training in 
industrial engineering. However, I did not find evidence at BMW South Africa to suggest 
that this option was exercised as NUMSA would have envisaged when it negotiated the 
provision. 
 
Related to the above, and also discussed in Chapter 4, NUMSA could consider subjecting 
work standards to negotiation. However, this would require developing capacity in 
alternative work standards, taking into consideration ergonomic factors and both the 
short- and long-term health and safety considerations for the worker, and taking care not 
to build a better environment for exploitation and facilitating private capital 
accumulation. If this were to be the case, the union would also have to choose whether to 
standardise the way work is done across industries where it organises. Different work 
standards might pose challenges to the union, which might in turn affect capacity. A 
situation in which organisers are faced with different work standards each time they enter 
different factories, including in the same sector, might prove unsustainable to the union. 
  
I wish to make a point about the entrenchment of flexibility, and associated worker 
insecurity – flexibility as partly represented by STCs, Absentee Pools (APs) and labour 
brokers – all of which are part of cost cutting measures in respect of labour (i.e. measures 
to suppress variable capital and with it necessary labour). The basic conclusion I reach is 
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that in constantly effecting changes in work and production organisation in order to 
increase the rate of surplus-value, defend associated milestones, compete for the 
maximum market share and accumulate more, capital is deepening real labour 
subordination. 
 
The highly flexible and insecure worker, vacillating wildly between employment and 
unemployment, is rendered beyond being the appendage of the machine to being 
essentially the appendage of production. As discussed in Chapter 4, in South Africa this 
takes place under conditions of a high structural unemployment rate. Moreover, I find 
that employer strategies such as WTA (as discussed in Chapter 4), have the effect of 
contributing to the deepening of real labour subordination to capital.  
 
At the same time, though, I find workers’ resistance growing in proportion and response 
to deepening subordination. By deepening subordination, capital is therefore at the same 
time mobilising labour’s resistance to exploitation. In this way, capital constitutes an 
impediment to itself. 
 
When faced with deepening subordination and under siege, labour tends to realise that it 
stands to gain by intensifying its responses. An important piece of evidence of this (as 
discussed in Chapter 4) is NUMSA’s all-year campaigning in 2009 in response to the 
crisis of the global capitalist system that led to increased restructuring, retrenchments, 
temporary lay-offs and short-time. NUMSA’s campaigning included, for instance, an 
intensified offensive against labour brokers, demanding that they be abolished once and 
for all.   
 
When all is said and done, however, the primary contradiction between labour and capital 
(as discussed in Chapter 2) is unlikely to be resolved through struggles – important as 
they are – that in the main end up as efforts to soften the hardest edges of capital. Thus 
labour, within both national and global settings, faces a challenge of developing broad 
and deep strategy and tactics aimed at capitalism as a system. Over and above 
spontaneous or short-term alternatives to capital’s strategies and forms for organising 
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work and production, this would therefore require a strategic, alternative vision to the 
capitalist mode of production. This implies strong programme and campaigns-based 
linkages with communities and other civil society formations. Without this, labour might 
prove to be running on a treadmill. 
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